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CAN LAW AND LITERATURE BE PRACTICAL?
THE CRUCIBLE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
Martin H. Pritikin*
ABSTRACT

Counter-intuitively, one of the best ways to learn the practice-oriented
topic of evidence may be by studying a work of fiction-specifically, Arthur
Miller's The Crucible, which dramatizes the seventeenth-century Salem witch
trials. The play puts the reader in the position of legal advocate, and invites
strategic analysis of evidentiary issues. A close analysis of the dialogue
presents an opportunity to explore both the doctrinal nuances of and policy
considerations underlying the most important topics covered by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, including the mode and order of interrogation, relevance,
character evidence and impeachment, opinion testimony, and hearsay.
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INTRODUCTION

Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first
article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel
Kant on evidentiary approaches in eighteenth-century
Bulgaria,or something, which I'm sure was of great interest to
the academic that wrote it, but isn't of much help to the bar.
-ChiefJustice John G. Roberts Jr.'
Chief Justice Roberts's remarks touched off a firestorm of commentary
regarding the relevance of law review articles to the current practice of law. 2
Although his remarks were not directed per se at evidence law, at
interdisciplinary scholarship, or at the relation between centuries old sources
and modem legal practice, the instant Article takes up the gauntlet laid down by
the Chief Justice on its own terms. I aim to demonstrate the following
deliberately counterintuitive proposition: because evidence law is so grounded
in practical reality, one of the best ways for budding practitioners to learn it is
through studying a work of fiction set in the seventeenth century. 3
Evidence law is, by its nature, a heavily rule-based, practice-oriented
topic. The rules of evidence are the "rules of the road" for trials; and a trial
lawyer must not only make her objections in a timely manner-usually a matter
of seconds-but also articulate the correct basis for her objection.
In such an environment, there is little room for the niceties of "policy"
teased out through the deconstruction of appellate opinions, which is what
occurs in the case-based approach often utilized in law school classrooms.

I

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Annual Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals Conference, CSPAN.ORG (June 25, 2011), http://www.c-span.org/Events/Annual-Fourth-Circuit-Court-ofAppeals-Conference /10737422476-1/ (a video of his remarks at the Annual Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals Conference).
2
See, e.g., vmerton, ABA Journal GeneratesMassive Commentary on C.J. Roberts' Critique
of Academic Legal Scholarship, A PLACE TO Discuss BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION

BLOG (July 9, 2011), http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2011/07/09/aba-journalgenerates-massive-commentary-on-c-j-roberts-critique-of-academic-legal-scholarship.
Not everyone would agree that this statement is counterintuitive. See, e.g., Lenora Ledwon,
The Poetics of Evidence: Some Applications from Law & Literature, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
1145, 1162 (2003) ("The objection that literature is the realm of the aesthetic and law is the realm
of the real, is far too pat.").
4
See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(i) (A claimed error in admitting evidence is waived unless the
party "(1) timely objects or moves to strike; and (2) states the specific ground, unless it was
apparent from the context.").
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Rather, students want and need to be able to recognize an objectionable
question or answer when they see it.5
In light of this, utilizing hypothetical problems, so as to require
students to role play as litigators who argue about the admissibility of
testimonial or other evidence, might seem preferable to reading cases. But both
the problem-based approach and the case-based approach suffer from a
common flaw: they usually do not provide the context that is critical to
evidentiary analysis.
In many instances, whether evidence is admissible depends on the
purpose for which it is offered. A good trial lawyer has to understand why
every question is being asked, why every piece of evidence is being offered. In
order to do so, she must understand how the evidence fits into her overall
theory of the case. Judicial opinions, more so than short hypotheticals, typically
lay out the relevant facts and procedural history of the case, thereby lending
some context to the evidentiary issues addressed therein. But such opinions are
often heavily redacted and edited for law school casebooks, and even full
opinions offer only a brief summary of what went on at the trial.
To really get a feel for how the rules of evidence work, the student or
attorney would ideally work an entire case from the ground up: interview the
client, propound discovery, review documents, conduct depositions, and do all
the pre-trial preparation.
Of course, even in full-blown litigation, the lawyer is still mediating
between the "real" reality and the version of reality to be presented at trial. A
lawyer rarely has all of the potentially relevant contextual information. She was
not there when the underlying events occurred. The best she can do is amass
facts from client and third-party interviews, informal investigation, and formal
discovery, and attempt to construct a coherent narrative representation of
reality-and obviously one that is favorable for her client.
In doing so, the rules of evidence shape how the story is presented to
the fact finder at trial. They will influence which facts can be heard by the jury
at all (relevance and admissibility generally); which facts must originate from
the witnesses versus those that can be suggested by the lawyers (leading and
non-leading questions); and which facts can be adduced through documents
versus those that must be obtained through live witness testimony (the rules of
hearsay and the confrontation clause and the best evidence rule).
The trial lawyer, knowing what story she wants to tell, has turned over
in her mind the various ways she might get a key piece of evidence admitted. Is
it a party-opponent admission? A statement against interest? An excited
utterance? Can I use this bad fact about the opposing witness's history as
character evidence? If not, what about for impeachment? She is also in the best
position to make the necessary split-second decisions about whether she wants

s
Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating, with
regard to obscenity, that "I know it when I see it").
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to try to exclude evidence proffered by her opponent, and about how to
"translate" that strategic impulse into a doctrinally legitimate basis for
exclusion that would be persuasive to the judge.
In short, because evidence is the linguafranca of a case presented in a
courtroom, the best way for students to learn the language is to immerse
themselves in a trial. I would further posit that one of the best ways for students
to simulate immersion in the full "story" of a trial, at least in a traditional
classroom setting, 7. is to read and analyze a stage play.
Plays are narratives that, due to the finite duration of live
performances, offer heightened and distilled versions of "reality." As such, they
can present the types of "fact patterns" that are the fodder for legal cases. In
order to create interest for the audience, the plot of a play will typically focus
on some form of conflict between characters; trials, of course, are necessarily
about the resolution of conflict. Plays can also illustrate ideas or issues, but are
much more than just a discussion of them;8 ideally, they will provide dramatic
richness and psychological and social context to the conflicts presented therein.
I propose that one play in particular-Arthur Miller's The Crucible,
which is based on the Salem witch trials of the late seventeenth centurypresents a powerful opportunity for students to learn about and apply both the
policies underlying and the doctrinal nuances of evidence law, and to develop
many of the critical analytical functions in which a trial lawyer engages.
Invoking the utility of analyzing a play in understanding the rules of
evidence obviously implicates the "law and literature" movement.9 Evidence

Cf James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV.
2014, 2022 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION (1988)) ("The text [the lawyer] makes, for example, might weave together psychiatric
and economic testimony, the client's own story in his own words, appeals to common
understandings, all transformed as they are put to work together in a way that is regulated by the
rules of evidence and shaped by her desire to persuade her audience.").
7
In my view, students learn evidence better by taking simulated trial advocacy classes, or by
actually working on real trials-be it through clinical offerings, externships, or some other form
of apprenticeship-than they do from taking a traditionally structured course in evidence law. (I
say this as someone who has taken evidence and trial advocacy courses as a law student, taught
both types of courses as a professor, and participated in real trials as a practitioner.) But the
purpose of this Article is not to advocate more mock trial training or clinical offerings for
students, beneficial as they are. Instead, I am interested in exploring ways to strengthen the
pedagogical utility of a traditional class on evidence.
6

See, e.g., David R. Samuelson, Hart, Devlin, andArthur Miller on the Legal Enforcement
of Morality, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 189, 190 (1998) ("The Crucible propels one far beyond Hart's
descriptions and explanations which are hobbled, along with Deviin's, by the boundaries of
ordinary discourse. Miller, by contrast, illustrates and animates these principles through setting,
plot, character, dialogue, feeling, and color, thereby giving them human texture.").
9
A fair amount has been written about the different strands that exist within the movement,
and whether it can even fairly be characterized as a "movement" at all. See, e.g., Jane D. Baron,
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law has received scant treatment within that movement,10 despite the fact that
trials are inherently dramatic." The limited extant scholarship tends to focus
more on "law as literature," applying different "interpretive modes" to the rules
of evidence themselves,12 than on "law in literature."' 3 This is understandable:
in order for "law in literature" to say much about evidence, the work in
question would seemingly have to focus around a courtroom drama, and the
vast majority of great literature has nothing to do with litigation. But The
Crucible, while arguably not a "courtroom" drama at all, is-in structure,
theme, and subject matter-a work that is particularly well-suited to
evidentiary analysis.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II argues why analyzing The
Crucible can be a useful endeavor for the student of evidence law. Part III
provides a brief synopsis of the plot of The Crucible, for those unfamiliar with
the play. Part IV, the bulk of the Article, analyzes passages from the play and
discusses how they relate to the policies and doctrinal operation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (the "Rules"). I first take up frequently-encountered issues
relating to the regulation of witness examinations, including form of the
question objections and witness sequestration. I then take up the most important
substantive evidentiary doctrines covered by the Federal Rules of Evidence,
including relevance, character evidence and impeachment, personal knowledge
and opinion, and hearsay. Part V concludes.
II. SUITABILITY OF THE CRUCIBLE FOR EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS

A.

Features Well-Suited to EvidentiaryAnalysis

In a sense, by virtue of the medium, any stageplay lends itself to the
sort of evidentiary analysis undertaken by a trial lawyer. Evidentiary objections
arise in the context of in-court examination of witnesses-questions and

Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059, 1062-66 n. 11
(1999).
1o
Ledwon, supra note 3, at 1150; see also Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and
New, 75 MINN. L. REv. 849, 850 (1991).
11
See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under
the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REv. 81 (1975); Ledwon, supra note 3, at 1149 ("Evidence
law, in particular, has strong affinities with the idea of poetics as a shaping with words, or the
creating of stories, for evidence is the area of law perhaps most closely tied to story[telling].").
12
See, e.g., Ledwon, supra note 3, at 1152-60 (identifying no less than ten different subcategories of law and literature scholarship relating to evidence law, only one of which involves
"evidence in literature.").
13
Baron, supra note 9, at 1071-72; see also Ledwon, supra note 3, at 1155-56 (utilizing
"evidence in literature" and "evidence as literature" categories, and referencing "'law in
literature' approaches (such as examining a novel or Shakespeare play for its use of legal
themes)").
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answers. During the course of such "dialogue," one or more pieces of
documentary or other "real" evidence may be introduced. So, too, a stage play,
circumscribed by the medium of a fixed stage and other technological
limitations of live performance, relies primarily on dialogue between actors, as
well as their interaction with scenery and props.14
Much as a trial transcript is a linear written representation of the live unfolding
of in-court proceeding, a stage play is the "transcript" or the live unfolding of
an on-stage performance. Moreover, just as one could read a "transcript" style
evidence question, and hone in on the appropriate objections and responses
regarding a given question or answer, one could pinpoint evidentiary issues in
much the same way in a stage play, focusing on a particular line or exchange of
dialogue." However, there are at least three features of The Crucible that
makes its study a particularly beneficial exercise to the student of evidence.
First, on a technical level, so much of the play involves not merely
dialogue, but dialogue in the form of interrogation. Thus, more so than most
plays, the dialogue in The Crucible raises specific issues regarding the
appropriate form of questioning. It is also more likely to raise substantive
evidentiary issues that can arise during an interrogation, because the
information sought by the interrogator may be irrelevant, unreliable, or
inflammatory if heard by a fact finder, and thus may be of a type that would be
excluded by one or more rules of evidence.
Second, The Crucible is structured to engage the reader 6 in the factfinding role. As noted above, when a lawyer takes on a case, she invariably has
no percipient knowledge. Instead, she tries to reconstruct the underlying events
post-hoc from various sources. So, too, in The Crucible, the key percipient
"event" that is at the heart of the dramatic conflict-the girls dancing and
conjuring spirits with the slave Tituba in the woods"-has already happened
when the first lines of dialogue are spoken in Act One.' 8 As the play unfolds,

Contrast this with a motion picture, which-depending on the production budget and
14
genre-can have an endless number and variety of settings, and can focus as much or more on
action and visual representation than on actors' dialogue.
is Admittedly, reading the text of a play does not allow the student to practice making splitsecond decisions regarding whether make objections during live testimony, as participating in a
real trial would. Indeed, nothing short of live or video-based exercises can offer that sense of
immediacy. Nevertheless, reading the text enables the student to immerse herself in the give-andtake dialogue between lawyer and witness. In any event, reviewing deposition or trial transcripts
for evidentiary issues is a function in which practicing lawyers frequently engage.
16
The term "reader" herein includes, where applicable, a viewer of a live performance of the
play.
For a summary of the plot of The Crucible, see discussion infra Part III.
'7
Prior to those first lines of dialogue, and in various other places in the written text of Act
18
One, Miller provides rather extensive background information regarding the community dynamic
in Salem as well as the backstory regarding and relationships between on-stage characters. This
information is, in part, useful to the actors to understand the motivation and personalities of their
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we learn more of those events through different people's accounts, including
those who had firsthand knowledge of them (Abigail, Tituba, Mary Warren),
and others who heard of or had other knowledge of the events (Parris, Proctor,
Mrs. Putnam). Similarly, the other events which may bear on people's
credibility and their motives to fabricate claims of witchcraft-such as John
Proctor's illicit activities with Abigail; the property disputes between
neighbors; or the multiple deaths of the Putnam children in childbirth, which
"out
makes the Putnams eager to indict the midwife Goody Osburn 9 _
competing
from
the
the
"truth"
together
tries
to
piece
there" already. The reader
snippets of testimony and evidence.
Third, the play engages the reader in the advocacy role, over and above
the fact-finding role. After all, there are many different kinds of fact finders.
One could be a judge or juror, resolving facts in order to decide a dispute. But
the reader of The Crucible does not have a say in the outcome. At the same
time, the reader is not a mere passive spectator, for she seeks to make sense of,
and make her own judgments regarding, the information being presented to her.
Specifically, the reader is invited to pass negative udgment on the hypocrisy
and inefficacy of the legal system presented therein. o
Thus, the reader is drawn into the role of the lawyer-advocate. 2 1 Part of
the obvious power of the play is that the reader-unlike the judges or almost
everyone else in the play-"knows" that witchcraft is not real, and so is
"rooting" for those who stand accused. Moreover, even accepting the
possibility of the supernatural, the reader is privy to conversations that reveal
that the s6ance in the woods that is at the heart of the story was motivated by
banal drives-Mrs. Putnam's desire to rationalize her misfortune in having lost
so many children; Abigail's desire to recapture the heart of her erstwhile
paramour, Proctor; and the other girls' desire to participate in risky or deviant
behavior out of sheer boredom or peer pressure-and not from the
"compulsion" of evil spirits or witches.
onstage personae, but it goes well beyond that. It provides historical context, and even offers
Miller's own perspectives. As the play would have been performed on stage, however, this
information would have been unavailable to the audience.
19

ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 47 (Viking Press 1953).

But see David R. Samuelson, "I Quit This Court": Is Justice Denied in Arthur Miller's The
Crucible?, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 619, 638 (1995) ("The play ... appears to tempt us to
mock Salem justice. But mockery would be useless, since it is an irritating, frustrating, and often
agonizing fact that legal logic does not require the truth."); id. at 620 ("My thesis is that the legal
decisions depicted in The Crucible, however monumentally unfair and unwelcomed, are not
necessarily unjust. Rather, from the standpoint of legal positivism, one can regard them as almost
compelled.").
21
To be clear, the play itself is far more than a mere advocacy piece. It is not merely didactic,
nor can it be simply written off as an allegory for the anti-Communist "witch hunts" that had
swept the nation-and affected Miller personally-just a few years prior to its being written. See,
e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 203 (noting that Miller was making a broader commentary than
a mere condemnation of McCarthyism).
20
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As such, in observing the progress of the proceedings from initial
accusation to formal trials to conviction and execution, the tragic impact of the
play lies in large part in the fact that we know that justice-in the sense of the
"truth" being affirmed and the "correct" result obtaining-is wanting.2 2 The
girls' accusations are false, the trier or fact is foolish for believing them, and
innocent people are being wrongfully condemned.
We are thus in the role of lawyers in the sense that we are far from
neutral, but rather we are "zealous advocates" for certain participants in the
legal proceedings. We want one version of the truth-that the girls are liars,
and that Elizabeth and the other defendants are not guilty of witchcraft-to
prevail.
To be sure, lawyers representing the parties in litigation do not have the
benefit of full information, as the reader does when a playwright like Miller
employs the technique of dramatic irony. But litigators often come to have a
similar sense of certainty as to what the "right" outcome is based on their
understanding of what the underlying "truth" is.
Thus, in analyzing the evidentiary issues raised in the play, the student
can adopt the role of one of the adversaries in the battle over competing
versions of the truth-in most cases, the defense lawyer representing Elizabeth
Proctor against the accusations of witchcraft. Viewing the facts from this
perspective, the "student-lawyer" has an intuitive sense of what evidence she
does or does not want admitted. Then, she must be able to "translate" that
strategic impulse into legal arguments that would persuade a judge. At the same
time, the student-lawyer needs to maintain objectivity and identify, articulate,
and weigh the best arguments on the other side, in order to determine the likely
outcome of the various evidentiary disputes. This is precisely what real trial
lawyers do all the time.
B.

Features Ill-Suited to Evidentiary Analysis

There are several features of The Crucible that admittedly present
obstacles to analyzing the exchanges of dialogue contained therein in light of a
codified system of evidence such as the Federal Rules. Before proceeding with
an evidentiary analysis of the play, it is worth pointing out these obstacles and
noting why they are not insurmountable.
First, although the play revolves around the Salem witch trials, it is not
a "courtroom drama" per se. In fact, none of the four acts is set in a courtroom
itself. Act Three is set in the anteroom just outside the meeting hall which is

22

Contra Samuelson, supra note 20, at 620-21 ("To regard [Proctor] as a victim of legal
injustice renders him a pathetic, as opposed to a tragic, figure. . . . Instead, as in all great
tragedies, the best lessons flow from viewing a heroic figure confronting, and then conquering,
the feebly understood self." (internal citation omitted)).
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serving as a courtroom,2 3 and although it opens with a brief exchange of incourt dialogue being heard just off stage, the courtroom itself is never seen.24
Second, the play is set in the late 1600s-not only hundreds of years
before the Federal Rules of Evidence were first enacted in 1975,25 but even a
century before the republic itself was founded. Indeed, Miller wrote the play
two decades before the Rules were enacted. It is undeniably anachronistic to
scrutinize fictional proceedings that predate our modem legal institutions
according to ex-post rules developed for those very institutions.
Third, the narrative proceeds from the premise that witchcraft is a real
phenomenon-an "invisible crime" 26 that could nevertheless be proven through
testimony and other circumstantial evidence. David Samuelson has argued that,
given such a premise, The Crucible is actually a tale of justice upheld, not
denied, when viewed through the lens of legal positivism. 2 7
Regarding each of these objections, there is both an omnibus response
and an individually tailored response. The omnibus response is: let the student
suspend disbelief.
Thus, as to the concern that the play is not a "courtroom" drama, it is a
simple matter for the student to ask: supposing the exchange were taking place
in a courtroom, how would it affect the admissibility of the testimony and other
evidence offered as "proof'? Moreover, in the middle of Act Three, when Giles
Corey asserts that Danforth lacks authority to declare him in contempt for
refusing to reveal certain information, Judge Danforth purports to "declare the
court in full session" in the anteroom to the courtroom. 28 It is unclear whether
this "session" continues for the duration of the Act, but it appears that at least a
portion of the action does take place "in court," if not in the courtroom proper.
Similarly, in response to the anachronism objection, one can say: let
the student ask what the outcome would be assuming that the various
interrogations were governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Furthermore,

23
MILLER, supra note 19, at 83 (describing the setting as "[t]he vestry room of the Salem
meeting house, now serving as the anteroom of the General Court," and noting that "[a]t the right
are two doors leading into the meeting house proper, where the court is being held").
24
Id. at 83-84.
25
See Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (Jan. 2, 1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
appendix, Federal Rules of Evidence (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
26
MILLER, supra note 19, at 100.
27
Samuelson, supra note 20, at 620.
28
MILLER, supra note 19, at 97.
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those Rules 2 9 are largely a codification of common law princi Ples or rulings
that had existed for decades or centuries prior to their enactment.
Finally, as to the objection that evidentiary analysis is meaningless in
the context of a narrative that supposes witchcraft could be genuine, there is,
again, the suspension of disbelief argument: let the student consider-even
assuming witchcraft were possible-what the evidentiary rulings should be.
There is at least one other retort: who says we do not today have our own
"invisible crimes"? 3 ' For example, given that a conspiracy-a "meeting of the
minds"-can be proven with regard to two people who have never met or
spoken,32 purely on the basis of circumstantial evidence, we should be hesitant
to brand the early colonists as naive or of a qualitatively different stripe than us.
Indeed, that was precisely Miller's point in drawing the analogy to the
McCarthy-era "witch hunts" of suspected Communist sympathizers.
In the next Section, I summarize the plot of The Crucible, in order to
provide sufficient background, for those unfamiliar with the play to understand
the evidentiary analysis that follows. Readers familiar with the play's plot may
wish to proceed directly to Section IV.
III. SUMMARY OF THE PLOT OF THE CRUCIBLE
Act One takes place in the spring of 1692 in Salem, Massachusetts.33
The setting is the inside of the house of the Reverend Samuel Parris, the
minister of Salem, where his daughter, Betty, is lying unconscious and
apparently ill. 34 The night before, Parris caught his daughter and his niece,
Abigail Williams, along with other teenage girls, dancing in the woods possibly
naked and participating in some sort of s6ance. We also learn that Ruth
Putnam, the daughter of Thomas Putnam, a prominent landowner, has likewise
been struck catatonic.3 6 Although there are rumors about town that the girls'
condition is the result of witchcraft, Abigail insists that the girls were engaged

"Rules" refers herein to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and "Rule" refers to a particular
Rule of Evidence.
30
I utilize the Rules in particular, as opposed to any other codification of evidence law,
because they are the ones most commonly taught in law schools and are utilized by the broadest
array of practitioners.
31
E.g., Samuelson, supra note 20, at 630 ("Our present legal system deals on a daily basis
with such invisible crimes-crimes known only to the accuser and to the accused.").
32
E.g., United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1274 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Government
need not prove that each conspirator agreed with every other conspirator, [or] knew of his fellow
conspirators . . . .").
33
MILLER, supra note 19, at 3.
34
Id.
29

36
36

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 13-14.
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in nothing untoward, and were merely shocked and fainted when they were
discovered. Parris is concerned that the rumors will tarnish his name in the
community, and although he has his doubts about Abigail's own reputation and
credibility, he is eager to believe her account." Nevertheless, as a precaution,
he has sent for Reverend John Hale, an expert in matters supernatural, from a
nearby town to investigate. 39
We then learn more about how the incident in the woods came about.
Thomas Putnam's wife, who had seven children die shortly after birth, believed
that Tituba, Parris's slave from Barbados, "knows how to speak to the dead.',o
Accordingly, Mrs. Putnam induced Ruth to engage Tituba to conduct a s6ance
to determine "what person murder[ed] [her] babies,"Al and Ruth invited her
friends to join in. Parris bemoans that Abigail's involvement with all this will
spell his ruin, but Putnam encourages him to get out ahead of the rumors: "Wait
for no one to charge you-declare it yourself."4 2
When Abigail is alone with some of the other girls, we learn that
Abigail drank blood at the s6ance as a "charm to kill John Proctor's wife."43
Abigail threatens the girls to not reveal that they did anything other than dance
or that anyone other than Tituba conjured spirits.4
Next, when Abigail is alone with Proctor, another local landowner, we
learn that Proctor had previously committed adultery with Abigail while she
was in his employ and that she was fired when the matter was discovered by
Proctor's wife, Elizabeth.45 Abigail confides to Proctor that the girls were
dancing in the woods and were discovered by her uncle Parris.46 Abigail
expresses her hatred for Elizabeth and her desire to continue her relationship
with Proctor, who rebuffs her.47
Hale then appears, learns of the girls having danced in the woods, and
interrogates Abigail.4 8 At first, Abigail denies everything. But under Hale's
intense questioning, she admits to having drunk blood at the nighttime
encounter-yet claims Tituba induced her to do so.49 Tituba, in turn, insists that

SId
38

at 9-11.
Id at 11-12.

3

Id at 9, 13-14.

40

Id. at 15.

41

Id. at 16.

42

45

Id
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21-24.

46

Id. at 22.

47

Id. at 23-24.

48

Id. at 36-38, 42-43.

49

Id. at 42-43.

43
4

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/7

12

Pritikin: Can Law and Literature Be Practical? The Crucible and the Federal
CAN LA WAND LITERATURE BE PRACTICAL?

2012]

699

everything that was done was harmless and was done at Abigail's instigation.50
But when threatened with hanging, Tituba blames the devil, and, when
pressured to identify others she has seen with the devil, names two disreputable
Salemites suggested by the Putnams.5 1 Abigail, mirroring Tituba's move,
admits to cavorting with the devil and names yet another accomplice.52 Betty
then "revives" from her stupor and names several other local citizens as well. 53
Act Two is set in Proctor's farmhouse eight days later.54 The
relationship between Proctor and his wife Elizabeth is strained, as the wounds
from his prior infidelity are not yet healed. Since the girls named names in
Act One, a court has been set up in Salem, with Governor Danforth presiding.56
Abigail is the star witness of that court, and anyone accused who refuses to
confess will be hanged.57 Proctor's current maidservant, Mary Warren-one of
Abigail's fellow accusers-arrives from court and informs the Proctors that
thirty-nine people have been arrested for witchcraft. The court apparently
invests full confidence in the girls' testimony.5 9 Mary Warren also reveals that
Elizabeth's name was "[s]omewhat mentioned" in the proceedings. 60 The
Proctors both know that Abigail hopes to take Elizabeth's place as John's
wife.61
Hale, apparently troubled by the recent implication of more prominent
townsfolk such as the Proctors, arrives to inquire into the couple's "Christian
character." 62 Elizabeth urges Proctor to reveal Abigail's confession that the
dancing in the woods had nothing to do with witchcraft.63 Cheever, the clerk of
the court, then comes to take Elizabeth, who has by now been formally accused
of witchcraft, into custody based in part on the evidence of a "poppet," or doll,
that Mary Warren had brought home from court that day. 64 Proctor forcefully

50
5'
52

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44-47.
Id at 48.

53

Id

54

Id. at 49.

ss

Id. at 50-51, 53-55.
Id at 52.
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 52-53, 58-60.

56

57
ss
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 59.
Id. at 60-61.

Id. at 63-64.
Id at 53, 68-69.
Id at 72-76.
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demands that Mary Warren go with him to court to expose the girls' empty
accusations. 65
Act Three is set in the anteroom of Judge Danforth's court on the
following day.6 6 Proctor, bent on saving his wife-as well as other friends of
his who have been accused-brings Mary Warren before Danforth and compels
her to admit that the girls' accusations of witchcraft were fabricated.67 Danforth
is reluctant to question the girls' credibility, but is willing to consider Proctor's
evidence.68
Proctor first presents a written "deposition" from ninety-one
townspeople vouching for the character of Elizabeth Proctor, Rebecca Nurse,
and Martha Corey. 69 Danforth issues warrants for "arrest for examination" for
each of the declarants, despite Francis Nurse's protestation that he had assured
them that "no harm would come to them for signing" it.70
Proctor next presents the deposition of Giles Corey, Martha's husband,
asserting that Thomas Putnam induced his daughter Ruth to falsely accuse their
neighbor George Jacobs of witchcraft in order to obtain Jacob's property. 71
Giles refuses to reveal the third-party source of his information, and so is put in
jail for contempt.72
Proctor then presents Mary Warren's own deposition. She resists
Danforth's suggestion that Proctor threatened her into making the written
statement, and under questioning she reaffirms what is alleged therein, i.e., that
the girls' accusations of witchcraft have been fabricated.74 Danforth then has
some of the accusing girls brought in and confronts them with Mary Warren's
charge. 5 Abigail will not back down from her prior testimony, nor will Mary
Warren retreat from her current assertion. 76
Proctor then tries to get Mary Warren to testify that the girls were
dancing in the woods, and that they were discovered by Parris.n Parris is
unable to deny this much. 8 Mary Warren's explanation for how the girls were
65
66
67

68
69
70
71
72
7

74
7s
76

n
78

Id at 79-81.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 87-89, 92.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
Id at 94.
Id at 95-96.
Id. at 96-98.
Id at 99-100.
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 105.
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able to faint in court, in the absence of genuine witchcraft, was that it was
"pretense." 7 9 Parris then seeks to test this proposition by seeing if she can faint
on the spot. However, she is unable to do so, as she has "no sense of it now."so
Danforth appears to offer the girls the option of adopting a middle
ground: that their accounts of having seen spirits were not deliberately
fabricated, but were, instead, the result of a genuinely held yet mistaken belief
at the time.81 Abigail, perhaps sensing that the tide is turning against her,
suddenly claims to be experiencing some demonic presence. The other girls,
taking up her lead, do the same. 83
Proctor, desperate and determined not to let Abigail derail the
proceedings in this manner, openly admits to having committed adultery with
Abigail, and accuses her of seeking to unseat Elizabeth through her false
accusation.84 He also asserts that Elizabeth discovered the affair, which is what
prompted Abigail's firing. To test this, Danforth calls Elizabeth before him
and-without giving her an opportunity to look at or communicate with Proctor
or anyone else-asks her to confirm or deny her knowledge of Proctor's
infidelity. Elizabeth, not knowing what has transpired to this point, covers for
her husband and denies any knowledge of the affair.
Danforth deems Elizabeth's denial to be conclusive evidence of the
falsity of Proctor's claim, but Hale asserts that Elizabeth's lie is a "natural [one]
to tell," and that he believes Proctor, not Abigail.8 8 Abigail and the other girls
again purport to be experiencing the manifestation of spirits.89 Mary Warren, no
longer able to resist the tide, turns on Proctor and claims that he is "the Devil's
man," who has sought to "overthrow the court." 90
Danforth demands that Proctor confess. 91 Proctor, his mind turned by
the absurdity of the situation, shouts that "God is dead." 9 2 Yet he hardly
accedes to the veracity of the girls' account: in his last line in the Act, he tells

7
80

Id. at 106.
Id. at 107.

82

Id. at 108.
Id. at 108-09.

83

Id

84

Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 110-11.
Id at 111-13.
Id.at 113.

81

85
86
87

90

Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 114-18.
Id at 118-19.

9'

Id at 119.

92

Id at 120.

8
89
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Danforth, "[y]ou are pulling Heaven down and raising up a whore!" 93 Danforth
orders Proctor's arrest, while Hale denounces the proceedings. 9 4
Act Four is set in the Salem jail on the day set for Proctor's
execution.95 Although the contagion of claims of witchcraft has spread far and
wide, leaving in its wake a parade of corpses, orphaned children, and untended
fields, there are signs that it is running its course.96 Abigail has absconded to
Boston with all of Parris's savings. 9 The people of nearby Andover have
reportedly sought to rebel against the court there. 9 8 Parris fears that the
townspeople will not countenance the execution of prominent citizens like
Francis Nurse or Proctor, and that rebellion will soon reach Salem as well. 99
Hale is reduced to pleading with prisoners to confess their "crimes" rather than
hang.ioo Not all are willing to do so: Rebecca Nurse calmly awaits the noose,
and Giles Corey chooses to be pressed to death rather than give in. 0o Danforth,
for his part, will countenance no wavering regarding the rightness of his
cause. 102
Hale makes an impassioned plea with Elizabeth-who will not face
execution at least until her pregnancy has come to term-to convince Proctor to
confess.10 3 In a private meeting with Elizabeth, Proctor concedes that he
"want[s] his life." 04 He is willing to "confess" to Danforth his association with
the Devil, but is unwilling to implicate anyone else, even those who have
already been found guilty by the court.105 Hale, seeking to avoid a prolonged
exchange about the matter, urges Danforth to have Proctor sign his written
confession and be done with the matter.106 However, Proctor finds himself
unable to sign: "I have given you my soul; leave me my name!" 07 He tears up
the paper and crumples it, ensuring his execution.10 8 Hale desperately entreats

94

Id.
Id.

9s

Id. at 121.

96

9

Id. at 125, 127, 130-31.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.

99

Id.

9

9

00

1o'
102

103
'
1os
106
107
108

Id. at 129-32.

Id. at 134-35, 140.
Id. at 129-30.
Id at 131-32.
Id at 137.
Id. at 138-41.
Id. at 141.
Id at 143.
Id at 144.
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Elizabeth to convince Proctor to relent, but she will not: "He have his goodness
now. God forbid I should take it from him!"l 09

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENTIARY ISSUES INTHE CRUCIBLE
In this Section, I endeavor to show that insights about important
evidentiary doctrines can be gleaned from an analysis of passages from The
Crucible. The goal is to be illustrative, not exhaustive. However, because one
of the primary benefits of analyzing the play is the richness of context it
provides, many of the vignettes selected will relate to each other, and the
analysis of certain passages will depend on, and will be deepened by, the
analysis of others.
A.

Orderand Mode ofPresentationofEvidence (Rules 611-615)

The numerous interrogation scenes in The Crucible provide an
opportunity for the student-lawyer to appreciate the subtleties regarding not
only the substantive matters inquired into, but also the form and mode of the
questioning. The Rules give the presiding judge broad discretion to regulate
witness examinations, with some general guidelines as to the policy
considerations at stake:
The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so
as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the
truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment.' 0
The Rules guide a judge in deciding what questions can be asked of a witness,
as well as the circumstances under which examinations will take place. These
issues loom large in a variety of contexts in The Crucible. Below, we will take
up three notable scenes in particular.
1.

The Interrogation of Tituba

Let us first consider the interrogation of Parris's slave, Tituba, in Act
One, in light of the guidelines laid down by the Rules. When Parris admits that
he saw Abigail and the other girls dancing in the woods, Abigail immediately
shifts the blame to Tituba, who is promptly summoned into the room for
questioning by Hale and others."' This, of course, is not a courtroom setting,
but one can still analyze the effect of the modes of questioning employed, and

"0' Id. at 145.
110

FED.R.EVID. 611(a).

I"

MILLER, supra note 19, at 43.
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consider whether there would be grounds to object to the questions if asked in
court.
a.

Form of the Question Objections

At first, Hale's questioning of Tituba is firm, but technically nonleading, as it does not suggest the answer in the question itself:
HALE: Woman, have you enlisted these children for the
Devil?
TITUBA: No, no, sir, I don't truck with no Devil!ll 2
Hale's next questions transition into a more overtly leading form of
interrogation. They are also, like many of his questions, compound:
HALE: Why can she not wake? Are you silencing this child?
TITUBA: I love me Betty!
HALE: You have sent your spirit out upon this child, have you
not? Are you gathering souls for the Devil?" 3
The potential dangers of asking such a rapid-fire succession of leading,
compound questions are obvious. The witness, hardly protected from
"harassment or undue embarrassment," may feel pressured to falsely confess,
thus making the questioning a far from "effective [procedure] for determining
the truth."'1 4 She also may easily become confused, as the questions broaden
from her conduct vis-d-vis Betty ("[y]ou have sent your spirit out upon this
child") to dealings with others ("[a]re you gathering souls .

.

. ?") before she

has a chance to answer.' 15 Moreover, compound questioning may not be
effective in exposing the truth, even assuming the witness does not feel put
upon. For example, if a witness is asked whether she saw the defendant hit and
kick the victim, but she only saw him kick the victim, she could honestly
answer "no" to that question, even though the response is misleading.
After additional accusations by Abigail, Hale quickly shifts further into
a more inquisitorial mode:
HALE, resolved now: Tituba, I want you to wake this child.
TITUBA: I have no power on this child, Sir.

112

id

113

Id. at 44.

114

FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
MILLER, supra note 19, at 44.

115
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HALE: You most certainly do, and you will free her from it
now! When did you compact with the Devil?'
Hale is now unmistakably leading the witness. In fact, in line with
textbook cross-examination technique, he is not even really asking a question at
all. He is asserting the fact that she has power over the child, and is simply
seeking her agreement with his statement.
The second part of his statement-"When did you compact with the
Devil?"-is also an example of a question that assumes facts not in evidence." 7
One cannot fairly ask when someone compacted with the Devil until it has been
established that they have compacted with the Devil. This is almost identical to
the classic law school illustration of a question assuming facts not in evidence,
"When did you stop beating your wife?," which assumes the witness started
beating his wife at some point. If a judge were present, such questioning should
not be permitted.
b.

Coerced Confessions

Despite Hale's harsh tone and the improper form of his questions,
Tituba stands up even to this intense cross-examination-that is, until she is
threatened with death, at which point she suddenly, and not surprisingly,
changes her tune:
TITUBA: I don't compact with no devil!

PARRIS: You will confess yourself or I will take you out and
whip you to your death, Tituba!
PuTNAM: This woman must be hanged! She must be taken and
hanged!
TITUBA, terrified,falls to her knees: No, no, don't hang Tituba.

I tell him I don't desire to work for him, sir.
PARRIS: The Devil?
HALE: Then you saw him! Tituba weeps. Now, Tituba, I know

that when we bind ourselves to Hell it is very hard to break
with it. We are going to help you tear yourself freeTITUBA, frightened by the coming process: Mister Reverend, I

do believe somebody else be witchin' these children.
HALE: Who?

116
117

id
id
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I don't know, sir, but the Devil got him numerous

witches."8

Once Tituba starts to go down this path, the remainder of the
interrogation process consists largely of her adopting whatever facts are
suggested to her:
HALE: When the devil comes to you does he ever come-with
another person? She stares up into his face. Perhaps another
person in the village? Someone you know.
PARRIS: Who came with him?

PUTNAM: Sarah Good? Did you ever see Sarah Good with
him? Or Osburn? ...
HALE, kindly: Who came to you with the Devil? Two? Three?
Four? How many?
TITUBA:

There was four. There was four.

PARRIS, pressing in on her: Who? Who? Their names, their
names!
TITUBA, suddenly bursting out:

Oh, how many times he bid me

kill you, Mr. Parris!
PARRIS: Kill me!
TITUBA, in a fury: He say Mister Parris must be kill! .. . And I

look-and there was Goody Good.
PARRIS: Sarah Good!
TITUBA, rocking and weeping: Aye, sir, and Goody Osburn.

MRS. PUTNAM: I knew it! Goody Osburn were midwife to me
three times. I begged you, Thomas, did I not? I begged him not
to call Osburn because I feared her. My babies always
shriveled in her hands!"9

To the student-lawyer, Tituba's act of "naming names" is obviously the
result of coercion. The exchange neatly illustrates the evils of coercing
confessions or otherwise extracting information through "enhanced"
interrogation techniques: not only does it deprive the one being interrogated of
the dignity to which they are entitled, but the information obtained is unlikely

18

Id.at4445.

SId.

at 45-47.
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to be accurate or reliable.12 0 When asked how many people accompanied the
Devil when he visited her, Tituba simply adopts the last number suggestedfour.121 And despite saying that four individuals visited her, the only two she is
able to identify by name-Goody Good and Goody Osburn-are the very same
two individuals that were just suggested to her by Putnam.122
If this were a courtroom setting and the student-lawyer were defending
Tituba (or Goody Good or Osbum, for that matter), she would object to these
leading, compound and argumentative questions.123 If exclusion of the
testimony were denied, the student-lawyer's fallback option would be to argue
to the fact finder that Tituba's confession and accusations of Good and Osburn
should be given virtually no weight because of the coercive circumstances
under which the evidence was obtained.
c.

Sequestration of Witnesses

This exchange between Hale and Tituba illustrates not only the impact
of asking leading questions, but also the importance of sequestration of
witnesses. Rule 615 provides that, with limited exceptions, "[a]t a party's
request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other
witnesses' testimony. Or the court may do so on its own." 24 The policy
rationale for sequestering witnesses is to help ensure that testimony is
untainted: a witness should testify without knowing what other witnesses have
testified to, so that they cannot "collude" to give consistent testimony (or know
how to contradict adverse witnesses).12 5
Here, Mrs. Putnam (and in all likelihood, Mr. Putnam as well) wants
Goody Osburn to be exposed as a witch, as this confirms her pre-existing
belief, and allows her to reconcile for herself why so many of her children died
in childbirth: "I knew it! Goody Osburn were midwife to me three times....

120

In response to Hale's assertion that the claims of witchcraft must be genuine because
people have confessed to the crimes, Proctor responds: "And why not [confess], if they must
hang for denyin' it? There are them that will swear to anything before they'll hang; have you
never thought of that." Id. at 69.
121 MILLER, supra note 19, at 45.
122
Id. at 46-47.
123
Alternatively, if Tituba's statements were deemed a coerced pre-trial confession, the
student-lawyer could argue that its admission would violate due process of law. See Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561-62 n.l (1958) (citing cases illustrating that "the settled view of this
Court [is] that the admission in evidence over objection of a coerced confession vitiates a
judgment of conviction").
124
FED. R. EVID. 615.
125
See FED. R. EvID. 615 advisory committee's note ("The efficacy of excluding or
sequestering witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging and exposing
fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.").
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My babies always shriveled in her hands!"l 26 Putnam suggests Osburn's name
to Tituba-with no apparent basis, at the time, for doing so-and Tituba takes
up his invitation to indict Osburn. 27 Had Hale questioned Tituba outside the
Putnams' presence, it is unlikely Tituba would have known to select Osbum as
her scapegoat. She probably would not have felt comfortable naming anyone at
all, lending less credence to her claims of witchcraft in the first place.
2.

The Examination of Mary Warren

There are other sequences that raise issues regarding leading questions,
sequestration, and the mode and order of examination. Consider the scene in
Act Three where Proctor brings Marry Warren before Danforth in an effort to
clear Elizabeth and the others. Danforth's initial concern, ironically, is whether
her present recantation of her prior testimony has been coerced:
DANFORTH:

Has Mr. Proctor threatened

you

for this

deposition?
MARY WARREN: No, sir.
DANFORTH: Has he ever threatened you?
MARY WARREN,

weaker: No, sir.

DANFORTH, sensing a weakening: Has he threatened you?
28
MARY WARREN: No, sir.1

Danforth's questions are "asked and answered": Danforth asks the
same question repeatedly, sensing (and hoping) that he will get a different
answer. 129 The irony of this exchange is that Danforth's instinct is correct. At
the end of Act Two, Proctor had physically grabbed Mary Warren and forced
her to come to court and confess to her prior fabrication: "[Y]ou will tell the
court what you know... . My wife will never die for me! I will bring your guts
into your mouth but that goodness will not die for me!"l 30 She is honest,
though, in the sense that the substance of her testimony, if not the reason why
she is now willing to provide it, was free from coercion. Nevertheless, asking
the same question repeatedly to elicit preferred testimony is improper.

126

MILLER, supra note 19, at 47.

127

Id. at 46-47.

Id. at 101.
That Danforth, as judge, examines Mary Warren is not itself objectionable. See FED. R.
EvID. 614(b) ("The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the witness.").
130
MILLER, supra note 19, at 80.
128

129
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Interestingly, Mary Warren withstands the harsh cross-examination of
Danforth, but cannot hold up to the scrutiny of Abigail and the other girls. Just
before the girls are brought in, Mary Warren sticks to her story that the earlier
testimony was perjured, however reluctantly:
DANFORTH: Then you tell me that you sat in my court,

callously lying, when you knew that people would hang by
your evidence? She does not answer. Answer me!
MARY WARREN, almost inaudibly: I did, sir. 3 1

But as soon as the other girls are brought in, Mary Warren is frozen in
terror. Proctor is the questioner who is on "direct" examination, but because
Mary Warren is so terrified of the girls, he has no choice but to lead herindeed, he essentially crams her testimony down her throat:
PROCTOR: Mary. Now tell the Governor how you danced in the
woods....
MARY WARREN: I-she glances at Abigail, who is staring
down at her remorselessly. Then, appealing to Proctor: Mr.
ProctorPROCTOR, taking it right up: Abigail leads the girls to the
woods, Your Honor, and they have danced there naked-. 132
This would actually be permissible in court: a vulnerable witness, such
as a child or a victim of trauma, or who is otherwise reluctant to testify out of
fear, may be asked leading questions even on direct examination.133
Of course, such leading questioning would not be necessary if the other
girls were not present in the first place. Arguably, forcing Mary Warren to
confront face to face those she is accusing is an ideal test of her veracity. But
Abigail is not the criminal defendant with a right to confront her accuser, and
even this bedrock principle may yield to considerations of witness protection. 134

Id. at

101.

Id. at 104-05.
FED. R. EvID. 61 1(c)(2) ("Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions except as
necessary to develop the witness's testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading
questions . . . when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with
an adverse party."); see also FED. R. EVID. 611(c) advisory committee's notes ("(N]umerous
exceptions have achieved recognition: The witness who is hostile, unwilling, or biased[, or] the
child witness or the adult with communication problems . . . .").
134
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 2006) (providing that children may testify via
closed-circuit television regarding certain sexual or other violent offenses).
132
133
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The Sequestration of Elizabeth Proctor

A comparison of the above questioning of Mary Warren with
Danforth's examination of Proctor's wife, Elizabeth, is irresistible. When
Proctor sees that Abigail refuses to confess to having lied, and that Danforth
still finds her credible, he discloses that he had previously slept with Abigail,
hoping that doing so will expose her motive to see his wife convicted. Proctor
further admits that Elizabeth became aware of the affair, and that is why she
fired Abigail. Danforth calls in Elizabeth to test the veracity of this assertion.
But to ensure that her testimony is untainted, Danforth insists-this time--on
sequestration:
DANFORTH:

He calls to the door. Hold! To Abigail. Turn your

back. Turn your back. To Proctor: Do likewise. . . . Now let

neither of you turn to face Goody Proctor. No one in this room
is to speak one word, or raise a gesture aye or nay. He turns
toward the door, calls: Enter! The door opens. Elizabeth enters
... Come here, woman. Elizabeth comes to him, glancing at
Proctor's back. Look at me only, not at your husband. In my
eyes only.

. .

. You will look in my eyes only and not at your

husband. The answer is in your memory and you need no help
to give it to me.135
Elizabeth ultimately lies and denies knowledge of the affair.1 3 6
Although she understandably does this to spare her husband's reputation,
Danforth takes this as conclusive proof that she is a liar, and that Proctor's
accusation against Abigail is baseless.1 17
In one sense, Danforth's sequestration "worked": Elizabeth didn't
know what answer she "should" give to help her position, thus lending
credibility to the answer she did give. However, as Hale recognizes, in the
absence of knowing the "correct" answer, it is "natural" for a wife to lie about
her husband's indiscretion, thus undermining the probative value of her denial
of knowledge of it.138
At first glance, Danforth's insistence on sequestering Elizabeth-and
in taking her sequestered testimony at face value-cannot easily be squared
with his treatment of Mary Warren. Out of the presence of the other girls, Mary
Warren admitted their collective claims of witchcraft were pretense.139 Under
the scrutiny of Abigail's stares, however, Mary Warren was unable to hold her

135
116

MILLER, supra note 19, at 112.
Id at 113.

137

See id at 113-114.

138

Id. at 114.
Id. at 101-02.

139
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ground.14 0 Yet Danforth chose not to accept her testimony in their private
exchange, and failed to give any weight to the influence that the other girls had
on her testimony.141 By contrast, with Elizabeth, Danforth found her
sequestered testimony to be definitive.142 Seemingly, the court has applied the
rules of sequestration inconsistently and unfairly.
However, the "prosecution" could probably justify Danforth's
differential treatment of the two witnesses. Mary Warren had just admitted to
lying, so her credibility was already impaired, and it needed to be further
tested; whereas Elizabeth had not previously offered testimony, so there was no
reason not to credit her answer. On a more basic level, because Mary Warren
had already provided testimony, the likelihood of ferreting out the truth was
increased by subsequently confronting her with the witnesses whose veracity
she was impugning. 14 3 In other words, it is easier to badmouth someone behind
their back than in front of their face. But with Elizabeth, who had not yet
testified, the facial expressions or statements of friendly and unfriendly
witnesses (Proctor and Abigail, respectively) could have signaled to her which
answer would favor her position, and those signals would have tainted her
response. Thus, sequestration, not confrontation, was the technique more likely
to generate truthful answers in that instance. 144 In this view, Danforth utilized
whichever techniques maximized truth-telling, and so acted properly.
Even if Danforth were found to have improperly applied the rules of
sequestration, it is far from clear that this would amount to reversible error on
appeal. It may be that the most the defense lawyer could hope for is to argue to
the fact finder that the differential treatment of the witnesses should be given
great weight in assessing their credibility-an unlikely prospect, unfortunately,

140

Id. at 104-05, 118-19.

141

Id

142

Id. at 113-14.

143
See id at 96. Upon reading Giles Corey's written accusation that Thomas Putnam induced
false charges to be issued against Putnam's neighbor, Danforth immediately confronts Putnam
with the accusation and, when Putnam denies it, demands that Corey back up the accusation with
proof. Id.
'"
There is another explanation suggested by the text itself. Early in Act Three, Danforth
reveals to Proctor that Elizabeth, now in custody, has claimed that she is pregnant. See discussion
infra Part IV.D (discussing that Elizabeth's pregnancy would provide her at least temporary
clemency). But Danforth asserts that a physical examination of Elizabeth has shown no sign of
pregnancy, to which Proctor responds:
PROCTOR: But if she say she is pregnant, then she must be! That woman will
never lie, Mr. Danforth.
DANFORTH: She will not?
PROCTOR: Never, sir, never.
MILLER, supra note 19, at 92. However, during the sequestration scene later in Act Three, there is
no indication from Danforth that he credits Elizabeth's denial of knowledge of Proctor's affair as
a result of Proctor's having previously vouched for her veracity. Id at 112-14.
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in a bench trial such as this one. This shows how a trial lawyer must have one
eye on winning at trial, while at the same focusing on potential grounds for
appeal in the event of an unsuccessful verdict. It also reinforces the limited
power of the rules of evidence themselves to ensure a "fair" trial.
B.

Relevance (Rules 401-402)

Relevance is perhaps the single most important foundational
substantive concept for the student of evidence to master, not only because it is
the initial threshold for admissibility,14 5 but because the admissibility of
evidence will often turn on the purpose for which it is offered. For example,
only an out-of-court statement offered "to prove the truth of the matter
asserted" is hearsay;146 if offered for some other purpose, the statement is not
hearsay. Similarly, character evidence is generally inadmissible when offered
"to prove that on a articular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait,"14' but it may be admitted if offered circumstantially to prove
-148
some other proposition.
At the same time, students sometimes have difficulty grasping relevance
precisely because it is so fundamental that no rule can be looked to as guidance
in assessing it. Although Rule 401 provides the test for relevance-evidence is
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence" 14 9 -this does not give any guidance as
to whether any particular category or item of evidence should be deemed
relevant. In this regard, it has been said that "[t]he law furnishes no test of
relevancy."o50 Rather, relevance must be assessed "in the light of logic,
experience, and accepted assumptions concerning human behavior"' 5' and
"[t]he court . . . must exercise broad discretion in drawing on its own

See FED. R. EvID. 402 ("Relevant evidence is admissible" unless otherwise provided by the
federal Constitution, laws, or rules, and "irrelevant evidence is not admissible.").
146
Id. at 801(c).
147
Id. at 404(a)(1).
148
Id. at 404(b)(2).
149
Id. at 401.
145

150
2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401:1, at 486 (7th ed. 2012)
(quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoMMON LAW
265 (1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
'5s
Id. § 401:1, at 484.
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experience in the affairs of mankind in evaluating the probabilities upon which
relevancy depends."l 52
1.

The Relevance of the Poppet

The Crucible presents a variety of scenarios in which the relevance of
evidence is called into question. For example, in Act Two, Ezekiel Cheever, the
recently appointed clerk of the court, comes to the Proctors' home bearing an
arrest warrant for Elizabeth, and asks if she possesses any "poppets."
Elizabeth, forgetting the rag doll that her maidservant Mary Warren had
brought to her earlier in the Act, 154 denies owning any, but Cheever notices the
doll sitting on the shelf
Hale and Proctor initially fail to grasp the supposed relevance of the
poppet to the formal accusation of witchcraft lodged against Elizabeth:
HALE: What signifies a poppet, Mister Cheever?
CHEEVER, turning the poppet over in his hands: Why, they say
it may signify that she-He has lifted the poppet's skirt, and
his eyes widen in astonishedfear. Why, this, thisPROCTOR, reachingfor the poppet: What's there?
CHEEVER: Why-He draws out a long needle from the
poppet-it is a needle! . . .

PROCTOR, angrily, bewildered: And what signifies a needle? . .
CHEEVER, wide-eyed, trembling: The girl, the Williams girl,
Abigail Williams, sir. She sat to dinner in Reverend Parris's
house tonight, and without word nor warnin' she falls to the
floor. Like a struck beast, he says, and screamed a scream that
a bull would weep to hear. And he goes to save her, and stuck
two inches in the flesh of her belly he draw a needle out. And
demandin' of her how she come to be so stabbed, she-to
Proctornow--testify it were your wife's familiar spirit pushed
it in.
PROCTOR: Why, she done it herself! To Hale: I hope you're not
takin' this for proof, Mister!

Id. § 401:1, at 486-87 (internal footnotes omitted); see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating
that whether "evidence is admissible" is a "preliminary question" for the court, in connection
with which it is "not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege").
15
MILLER, supra note 19, at 72-73.
154 Id. at 56.
152
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Hale, struck by the proof is silent.
CHEEVER: 'Tis hard proof! To Hale: I find here a poppet
Goody Proctor keeps. I have found it, sir. And in the belly of
the poppet a needle stuck. I tell you true, Proctor, I never
warranted to see such proof of Hell, . . .
When the questioning about the possession of poppets is first posed, no
foundation for its relevance had been laid, nor was its relevance "apparent from
the context."' 56 Although the threshold for relevance is low-"a brick is not a
wall," as the famous saying goes' 7-in the ordinary course, one would not see
any logical connection between the keeping of a poppet and the serious
criminal accusation of witchcraft. As such, if Cheever were to have posed the
question in court and a relevance objection were raised, in the absence of an
"offer of proof," 58 a court would likely sustain the objection, and rightly so.
When Cheever lifts the doll's skirt and discovers the needle embedded
in its belly, the relevance of the evidence becomes quite obvious-to him. But
even at this point, unless and until he provides any additional context, a judge
would rightly exclude the evidence.
However, once Cheever reveals Abigail's allegation that Elizabeth's
spirit caused her sharp abdominal pains, the logical connection becomes clear:
the doll is strong evidence corroborating Abigail's account that Elizabeth's
"familiar spirit" pushed in the needle found in Abigail's abdomen. What was
murky and meaningless a moment earlier suddenly becomes fraught with
meaning, demonstrating that relevance is entirely relative to the proposition for
which evidence is offered.
To Cheever, this is as solid as evidence gets; there is no explanation
other than witchcraft for how Elizabeth would possess a poppet with a needle
in the belly, just as Abigail claimed. To Proctor, conversely, it is no evidence at
all. From Proctor's perspective, once he learns that Abigail, his wife's rival for
his affections, is the one claiming to have been harmed by his wife, there is
only one possible explanation for Abigail's injury: "she done it herself!"'"
Of course, applying our modem Western sensibility that would dismiss
witchcraft as superstition, or at the very least as something within the realm of
theology and therefore not susceptible to serious judicial inquiry, we would not
entertain the possibility that one's "spirit" could drive a needle into someone,

'
156

Id. at 74-75.
FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(2).

157
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 278 (abr. 5th ed.
1999); see also 2 GRAHAM, supra note 150, § 401:1, at 487.
158
See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) ("A party may claim error in a ruling only if the error affects a
substantial right of the party and . .. if the ruling excludes evidence, the party informs the court
of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context.").
159 MILLER, supra note 19, at 74.
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or that this could be achieved through a voodoo-like mechanism of impaling a
needle in a doll. Under this view, the only plausible explanations are that
Abigail has engaged in either an innocent mistake or willful fabrication.
But this illustrates just how dependent a legal assessment of relevance
turns on the judge's "logic, experience, and accepted assumptions concerning
human behavior,"i1 6 o and how those "accepted assumptions" are, in turn,
dependent upon the time, place, and circumstances in which the judge lives. In
the Salem of 1692 presented to us in The Crucible, both the existence of a
divine Creator and the possibility of genuine witchcraft was not only given
credence, but it was also effectively taken for granted. 16 While we may smirk
at the naivet6 or excessive religiosity of that society, a fair assessment of
relevance must take those "accepted assumptions" into account.
When the evidence is considered in that light, neither Cheever nor
Proctor are correct. The poppet is not conclusive evidence of witchcraft, as
Cheever would insist; nor is it wholly irrelevant, as Proctor maintains. 16 2 Given
the then-existing assumptions about the possibility of witchcraft, the poppet
evidence had some tendency to make more plausible the assertion that
Elizabeth was a witch, which is all that is required to pass the low threshold of
relevance. The relevance objection would properly be denied.
2.

The Impact of Contradictory Evidence

Proctor succumbs to a fallacy common among trial lawyers: he
assumes that the existence of contradictory evidence negates the relevance of
an item offered in evidence.' 63 Immediately following the exchange quoted
above, Elizabeth re-enters with Mary Warren, and Proctor grills the latter about
the poppet:
PROCTOR: It is your poppet, is it not?

160

2 GRAHAM, supra note 150, § 40 1:1, at 484.

Samuelson, supra note 20, at 634 ("[N]one of [Danforth's] listeners yields to a shred of
doubt that God's word is the proper root of the community's law."); see also MILLER, supra note
19, at 6 ("It was ... an autocracy by consent, for they were united from top to bottom by a
commonly held ideology whose perpetuation was the reason and justification for all their
sufferings.").
162
See 2 GRAHAM, supra note 150, § 401:1, at 487 ("The concept of logical relevancy
employed in Rule 401 must be kept separate from issues of sufficiency of evidence for any
purpose such as to satisfy a burden of production." (footnote omitted)).
163
To be fair, this exchange does not take place at trial. To draw an analogy to judicial
proceedings, Proctor is arguably in the position of one seeking to have an indictment quashed,
and so the sufficiency, and not merely the admissibility, of the evidence really is the central
question. While this highlights the need to acknowledge the limitations of comparing a stage play
to an actual courtroom proceeding, this should not hold the reader back from analyzing
admissibility issues assuming it was a trial. See discussion supra Part II.
161
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MARY WARREN, not understandingthe direction of this: It-is,
sir.
PROCTOR: And how did it come into this house?
MARY WARREN, glancing about the avidfaces: Why-I made
it in the court, sir, and-give it to Goody Proctor tonight.
PROCTOR, to Hale: Now, sir-do you have it?
HALE: Mary Warren, a needle have been found inside this
poppet.
MARY WARREN, bewildered: Why, I meant no harm by it, sir.
PROCTOR, quickly: You stuck that needle in yourself?
MARY WARREN: I-I believe I did, sir, IPROCTOR, to Hale: What say you now?
HALE, watching Mary Warren closely: Child, you are certain

this be your natural memory? May it be, perhaps, that someone
conjures you even now to say this?
MARY WARREN: Conjures me? Why, no, sir, I am entirely
myself, I think. Let you ask Susanna Walcott-she saw me
sewin' it in court. Or better still: Ask Abby, Abby sat beside
me when I made it.
PROCTOR, to Hale, of Cheever: Bid him be one. Your mind is
surely settled now. Bid him out, Mr. Hale.16
Mary Warren's answers establish three things. First, they corroborate
Elizabeth's version of how the poppet came into the home. Second, they show
that Mary Warren, not Elizabeth, caused the needle to be inserted in the doll.
And third, they reveal that Abigail witnessed Mary Warren insert the needle
and saw her do so prior to Abigail claiming that the needle in her own
abdomen was caused by Elizabeth's "spirit." As Proctor establishes each
proposition, he interrupts his interrogation of Mary Warren to see if Hale is
sufficiently convinced. By the time Proctor has established the third
proposition, the matter is settled in his view: he has shown not only that
Elizabeth did not inflict Abigail's injury, but that Abigail was in a position to
inflict it herself with the knowledge that by so doing she could falsely implicate
Elizabeth.
But Mary Warren's revelations do not make the poppet evidence
irrelevant. The existence of contradictory evidence, or evidence that attacks the

164

MILLER, supra note 19, at 75-76.
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weight or credibility of the original evidence, typically should not affect the
admissibility of the original evidence and thereby operate to prevent the fact
finder from hearing or seeing the evidence. Rather, the fact finder should
receive both the evidence and the contradictory or impeaching evidence. The
issue of which of the competing items of evidence the fact finder should credit
becomes an issue of weight, not admissibility.16 1
Thus, in the context of a judicial proceeding, although the studentlawyer would, like Proctor, wish to have the poppet evidence excluded, it is
relevant and, in the absence of some other grounds for exclusion, should be
admitted. Mary Warren's testimony should also be admitted as evidence to
rebut the inference that the poppet connects Elizabeth to witchcraft, and
perhaps more importantly, to undermine Abigail's credibility. It is thus to the
rules regulating evidence pertaining to witness credibility that we turn to next.
C.

CharacterEvidence and Impeachment (Rules 404-405, 607-610)

In many trials, most of what the fact finder learns about the case comes
from the mouths of witnesses. But witness testimony is hardly a perfect
reproduction of the facts or events testified to. Rather, testimony is a
reconstruction of those facts, one that is mediated by the witness's perceptions
of events through her senses; by the storage and recollection of those perceived
events in the witness's memory; and by the witness's communication of those
memories, which she may deliberately or inadvertently alter. Because the fact
finder must decide how closely the witness's version of reality tracks reality
and which competing versions to believe,16 6 it is said that evidence supporting
or attacking a witness's credibility is always material.167
Yet whether evidence that bears on credibility is admissible is another
matter entirely. Such evidence, while "material," may have little or nothing to
do with the underlying facts of the case. Thus, the evidence may unduly

165

See FED. R. EVID. 104(a)-(b), (e).

See MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL RULES: A
PROBLEM APPROACH 32 (4th ed. 2008) ("[O]ften a trial's outcome will depend on which of two
conflicting versions of an event a jury believes. Accordingly, evidence of the veracity or
mendacity of the witness may be of special consequence to the determination of the action.").
167
The recent stylistic revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence use the phrase "fact is of
consequence in determining the action" in lieu of the arguably more ambiguous term "material."
2 GRAHAM, supra note 150, § 401 :1, at 473. 1 use the term "material" or "materiality" herein for
the sake of brevity, and because it is a term with which many judges and practitioners are
familiar. In any event, whatever the terminology employed, the concept includes within it "facts
bearing circumstantially upon the evaluation of the probative value to be given to other evidence
in the case, including demonstrative evidence and the credibility of witnesses." Id. § 401:1, at
495 (footnotes omitted).
166
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consume time or distract the fact finder from the central issues. 16 8 There is also
the risk that the jury will give undue weight to impeachment evidence, or
utilize it for improper purposes such as the propensity inference.169 The Rules
include numerous limitations on the circumstances under which evidence may
be introduced for impeachment and/or propensity purposes, while also carefully
regulating the mode and types of evidence."o As in a trial, issues of witness
credibility are at the core of The Crucible: whether or not to believe that the
girls have been the victims of witches, or whether they have simply fabricated
the whole thing in order to cover up their having been caught dancing in the
woods or because they have been swept up by the tide of their peers' hysteria.
The Crucible offers a prime opportunity to explore how an individual's bias,
reputation, and other characteristics are utilized in assessing their credibility,
and to consider how the admissibility of such matters would be handled under
the Rules. In fact, the flow of Act Three is essentially one big credibility
contest, in which the stakes are continually raised. It is useful to examine some
of the applicable passages in depth, for the distinctions between character and
impeachment evidence, and the relationship between these doctrines and other
bedrock evidentiary concepts, are subtle and often lost not only on students but
on practitioners as well.
1.

The Credibility Contest Between Mary Warren and Abigail
Williams

Mary Warren has the potential to be the star witness in Elizabeth's
favor, as Mary has been among the chief accusers of those facing charges of
witchcraft. When Proctor shows Judge Danforth Mary Warren's written
deposition disavowing her (and the other girls') earlier accusations of
witchcraft, Danforth assails her credibility on the basis of her having made
inconsistent statements. 17 '

MENDEZ, supra note 166, at 514 ("Despite the unquestioned relevance of such evidence,
the rules proceed on the assumption that the unrestrained use of evidence on witness credibility
may distract from and confuse jurors about the issues to be decided.").
169
For example, the fact that a defendant on trial for bank robbery has been convicted of
robbing three banks in the past is probative of the fact that he may not respect the oath to tell the
truth under penalty of perjury, and so may bear on his credibility as a witness. See FED. R. EVID.
609(a)(1)(B). But the jury is at least as likely to use the evidence for the impermissible inference
that he is the "type" of person who robs banks, and so likely robbed the one in question. See id.
at 404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.").
"o See, e.g., id. at 404-06, 412-15, 608-10.
1'
See MILLER, supra note 19, at 101-02 ("DANFORTH: Then you tell me that you sat in my
court, callously lying when you knew that people would hang by your evidence? . . . [Y]ou are
either lying now, or you were lying in the court, and in either case you have committed perjury
and you will go to jail for it. You cannot lightly say you lied, Mary.").
168
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Proctor tries to defend Mary Warren's credibility, pointing out: "Mr.
Danforth, what profit this girl to turn herself about? What may Mary Warren
gain but hard questioning and worse?" 72 But just as Proctor could not earlier
use Abigail's impaired credibility to neutralize her testimony against Elizabeth
about the needle in the doll, he cannot now convince the judge that Mary
Warren's about-face should negate her prior accusations simply because her
braving the severe consequences of coming clean bolsters her credibility.
a.

Distinguishing Between Impeachment Evidence,
Character Evidence, and Circumstantial Evidence

Danforth next confronts Abigail and the other girls with the general
substance of the assertions in Mary Warren's deposition.' 73 When neither Mary
Warren nor Abigail is willing to back down from their positions, Danforth
confronts Abigail with Mary Warren's specific contention that Abigail's story
about Elizabeth "stabbing" her via the poppet was false:
turning to Abigail: A poppet were discovered in
Mister Proctor's house, stabbed by a needle. Mary Warren
claims that you sat beside her in the court when she made it,
and that you saw her make it, and witnessed how she herself
stuck her needle into it for safe-keeping. What say you to that?
DANFORTH,

ABIGAIL, with a slight note of indignation:It is a lie, sir.174

Since Abigail still will not relent, Danforth seeks corroborating details
that will either support or contradict one of the girls' versions of events:
you worked for Mister
Proctor, did you see poppets in that house?
DANFORTH, after a slight pause: While

ABIGAIL: Goody Proctor always kept poppets.175
It is not clear what exactly Danforth seeks to establish by his question.
It may be that if Elizabeth kept poppets previously, it is more likely that she
keeps poppets now. If so, this would support Abigail's credibility (and
undermine Mary Warren's). But it would also arguably run afoul of the ban on
character evidence under Rule 404(a)(1), as it relies on the impermissible
propensity inference: that because Elizabeth is the "type" of woman who kept
poppets in the past, it is more likely she kept poppets in connection with the
events in question. Conversely, the evidence may be used circumstantially to

172

Id at 104.

'
114

Id at 102-03.
Id at 103.

'

Id
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show that Elizabeth had the opportunity to possess and use a poppet in aid of
witchcraft on the event in question itself. This, too, would help resolve the
credibility contest between the two girls. If offered for this purpose, it arguably
would not violate the ban on character evidence because it would fall within the
limitation under Rule 404(b), which allows specific instances of prior conduct
to be used to establish "another purpose" besides propensity, such as
"opportunity." 176 This illustrates the nuanced distinctions that the studentlawyer must make in articulating permissible and impermissible purposes for
introducing evidence.
b.

The Interplay of Impeachment Evidence and the
Hearsay Rule

Proctor then jumps into the fray, not only personally contradicting
Abigail's account but invoking Mary Warren's conflicting testimony. Cheever,
the clerk, also offers his input:
PROCTOR: Your Honor, my wife never kept no poppets. Mary
Warren confesses it was her poppet.177
CHEEVER: When I spoke with Goody Proctor in that house, she
said she never kept no poppets. But she said she did keep
poppets when she were a girl.
Cheever's "testimony" raises some interesting issues regarding the
common interaction between the rules governing impeachment evidence and
the rules regarding hearsay. 79

FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act "may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident."). The Rule further provides that notice of intent
to use past acts evidence for such a purpose must be given to a criminal defendant beforehand, in
most instances prior to trial. Id.
176

177

MILLER, supra note 19, at 103.

Id. at 103.
It also raises a possible issue regarding the propriety of Cheever, a "clerk of the court,"
providing testimony against a defendant. Id. at 72. Rule 605 provides an automatic rule of
incompetency for presiding judges. See FED. R. EVID. 605 ("The presiding judge may not testify
as a witness at the trial. A Party need not object to preserve the issue."). Although the rule does
not expressly address the competency of judicial staff to testify, case law has held that testimony
by a judge's law clerk impermissibly taints the jury's verdict. See Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1977). However, given that Cheever personally delivered the
arrest warrant for Elizabeth, his role may be more akin to that of a law enforcement officer than a
judicial officer, and so Rule 605 may not be implicated. But elsewhere in Act Three, when he
disclosed to Danforth that Proctor has engaged in farm work on Sundays, Cheever, says,
apologetically, "I think it be evidence, John. I am on official of the court, I cannot keep it."
MLLER, supra note 19, at 91.
i78

9
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Hearsay statements are often offered to support or attack someone's
character or credibility; to be admissible, they must not only satisfy character
evidence or impeachment rules, but also the hearsay rule. 80 When Cheever
offers Elizabeth's out-of-court statement corroborating both Proctor's and Mary
Warren's assertions that Elizabeth never kept poppets, it appears to be hearsay
not falling within the exemption for party-opponent admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(A). That Rule excludes from the definition of hearsay statements
"made by the party," but only if they are "offered against an opposing party. 1 1s
Here, Elizabeth's out-of-court statement is arguably a statement by the party
proponent because it is being offered by Cheever to assist Elizabeth. Nor
should the statement be admitted as a prior consistent statement under Rule
801(d)(1)(B), which allows a statement that "is consistent with the declarant's
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so
testifying."1 82 Although Elizabeth's veracity on the issue of keeping poppets
has been at attacked, the statement is not consistent with her testimony, as she
has not yet testified in the proceeding.
However, if the statement is being offered merely to contradict Abigail,
and thereby impeach her credibility, it is arguably not being offered for the
truth of the matter asserted, and so is admissible non-hearsay. 83 A prior
inconsistent statement is relevant regardless of the truth of the matter asserted
therein, and so is non-hearsay, because the mere fact that someone has made
contradictory statements is relevant to their credibility, regardless which
version is "correct."l84
The "prosecution" would respond that the out-of-court statement is
Elizabeth's statement, not Abigail's: it does not show that Abigail has spoken
out of both sides of her mouth. Elizabeth's statement only undermines
Abigail's credibility because it contradicts her testimony, but the statement can
only operate to contradict her testimony if it is true. As such, the hearsay
problem remains.
Even if a judge accepted the impeachment rationale to admit Cheever's
first statement (that Elizabeth does not currently keep poppets) over a hearsay
objection, Cheever's second statement (that Elizabeth admitted that she used to
keep poppets as a girl) supports, rather than impeaches Abigail's testimony.
Thus, the non-hearsay purpose of impeaching Abigail's testimony clearly
cannot be relied upon. But to the same extent that Cheever's first statement
could not be admitted as a party opponent admission against Elizabeth, this

See FED. R. EVID. 801.
181 Id. at 801(d)(2)(A).
182
Id. at 801(d)(1)(B).
18o

183

184

See id. at 801(c)(2).
See id. at 401.
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statement should overcome a hearsay objection under that same theory, as
Cheever is volunteering testimony that is adverse to Elizabeth.
Thus, if either or both of Cheever's statements are admitted, it would
likely be for quite different reasons: the former would be admitted only because
it is not used for the truth, and the latter even though it is used for the truth.
The student-lawyer must be sensitive to the subtle distinctions between the
applicable hearsay and impeachment doctrines so that the student-lawyer can
persuasively advocate for the exclusion of harmful evidence and the admission
of helpful evidence.
c.

Impeachment Evidence and Undue Prejudice

Proctor, seeking to shut down any contrary evidence, argues the
tenuous probity of Cheever's latter statement, and the ensuing exchange nicely
illustrates how easily-to use McCormick's terminology-the "sideshow"
about witness credibility can overtake the "circus" on the disputed issues.'
(Cheever's last lines of dialogue are repeated here for context):
CHEEVER: When I spoke with Goody Proctor in that house, she
said she never kept no popets. But she said she did keep
poppets when she were a girl.
PROCTOR: She has not been a girl these fifteen years, your
Honor.
HATHORNE: But a poppet will keep fifteen years, will it not?
PROCTOR: It will keep if it is kept, but Mary Warren swears
she never saw no poppets in my house, nor anywhere else.
PARRIS: Why could there not have been poppets hid where no
one ever saw them?
PROCTOR, furious: there might also be a dragon with five legs
in my house, but no one has ever seen it.
PARRIS: We are here, Your Honor, precisely to discover what
187
no one has ever seen.
Proctor points out the absurdity of trying to disprove a negative. In his
view, the lack of affirmative evidence of poppets (or of witchcraft, or of
anything else, for that matter) should be sufficient for an acquittal. But to

185
186

'

CHARLES MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
MILLER, supra note 19, at 103.

§ 40,

at 81 (2d ed. 1972).

Id. at 103-04.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/7

36

Pritikin: Can Law and Literature Be Practical? The Crucible and the Federal
CAN LA WAND LITERATURE BE PRACTICAL?

2012]

723

Parris, the absence of affirmative evidence is endemic to the supernatural,
invisible nature of the crime, and is hardly indicative of innocence.
Setting aside the larger epistemological issues, the parties are arguing
over an issue-whether Elizabeth Proctor ever kept poppets at any point in her
life-that is at best tangentially related to the central issue of whether she is
guilty of the instant crime of witchcraft. Proctor attacks the probative value of
Cheever's retelling of Elizabeth's admission that she once kept poppets. That
admission only partly contradicts Proctor's statement that she never kept
poppets. Proctor's statement itself contradicts Abigail's assertion that Elizabeth
kept poppets while Abigail was in her employ. Abigail's assertion, in turn, was
seemingly brought up merely to corroborate one of the girls' accounts of how
Elizabeth came to be in possession of the poppet in question. The inquiry
regarding how the poppet came to be there was only raised in order to resolve
the issue of the two girls' comparative credibility. And ultimately, the girls'
credibility is not an ultimate issue in itself, but rather aids the fact finder in
determining whether to believe in Elizabeth's guilt or innocence.
The student-lawyer should realize that, although she, like Proctor, may
be eager to defend Mary Warren's credibility and undermine Abigail's (in an
effort to defend Elizabeth), many judges would have cut off this line of
questioning well before it reached this point, due to it being a waste of time or
confusing and misleading.' 89
2.

The Attack on Abigail Williams's Credibility
a.

Character Evidence Used to Attack Credibility

Proctor's defense of Mary Warren's credibility is viewed by Danforth
as an attack on Abigail. Proctor does not disabuse Danforth of that notion, and
188
A related phenomenon occurs when Parris, noting that Mary Warren's prior accusations of
witchcraft-which she now claims were fabricated-were accompanied by fainting, challenges
Mary Warren to faint on command. Mary Warren tries, but is unable to do so because of the
stress of the situation:
I have no sense of it now . .. I heard the other girls screaming, and you, your
Honor, you seemed to believe them and I-It were only sport in the beginning,
sir, but then the whole world cried spirits, spirits, and 1-I promise you, Mister
Danforth, I only thought I saw them but I did not.
Id. at 106. Much like the infamous "if it doesn't fit you must acquit" in-court demonstration in
the O.J. Simpson murder trial, Mary Warren's inability to feign fainting is hardly conclusive
evidence that her prior spells were the genuine product of witchcraft. But once the evidence is
presented, it is up to the fact finder to determine the weight to accord it vis-Ai-vis the witness's
credibility.
189
For example, Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
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promptly switches from defense to offense, overtly impugning Abigail's
character:
DANFORTH: You are charging Abigail Williams with a
marvelous cool plot to murder, do you understand that?
PROCTOR: I do, sir. I believe she means to murder.
DANFORTH, pointing at Abigail, incredulously: This child
would murder your wife?
PROCTOR: It is not a child, sir. Now hear me, sir. In the sight of
the congregation she were twice this year put out of this
meetin' house for laughter during prayer.
DANFORTH, shocked, turning to Abigail: What's this? Laughter
during-!
PARRIS: Excellency, she were under Tituba's power at that
time, but she is solemn now.
COREY: Ay, now she is solemn and goes to hang people!
DANFORTH: Quiet, man.

HATHORNE: Surely it have no bearing on the question, sir. He
charges contemplation of murder.
DANFORTH: Aye. He studies Abigail for a moment, then:
Continue, Mr. Proctor.' 90
The student-lawyer, knowing that Abigail is duplicitous, would like
unfavorable to her to be considered and credited. Danforth's
evidence
any
instruction to Proctor to proceed with his presentation suggests that, to
Danforth, Abigail's prior misconduct-being expelled from church for
laughing during prayer-does "have bearing on the question" of whether she
has engaged in a "marvelous cool plot to murder," as Proctor "charges."
But in trying to defend the admissibility of this evidence, the studentdefense lawyer must now consider at least the following two questions: how is
Abigail's prior misconduct probative of a relevant proposition in the instant
proceeding? And if it is probative of a relevant proposition, is the evidence
being offered in the proper form? A careful deconstruction of the potentially
relevant evidentiary rules is in order.
It may be thought that Abigail's prior conduct is being offered as
evidence of her character. Rule 404(a)(1) states the general ban on propensity
evidence: "Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible

190 MILLER, supra note 19, at 104.
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to prove that on a particularoccasion the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait." 191 But although Proctor is said to be "charging" Abigail with
a plot to murder his wife through fabricated testimony, Abigail is not presently
a defendant on trial for perjury or attempted murder. Rather, she is the star
witness in Elizabeth's trial for witchcraft. As such, it is Elizabeth's conduct "on
a particular occasion" (i.e., her alleged use of witchcraft against Abigail) that is
being adjudicated, not Abigail's, and so Rule 404(a)(1) would not apply to this
testimony.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that whether Abigail acted dishonestly in
the past bears on whether she is acting "in accordance with" that character trait
on the particular occasion of her testifying against Elizabeth. To resolve this
frequently occurring ambiguity as to whether such evidence falls within the
general prohibition of propensity evidence in Rule 404, subsection (a)(3) of that
Rule provides an explicit carve-out for evidence bearing on the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of a testifying witness: "Evidence of a witness's
character may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609."l92 In other words,
the admissibility of character evidence used to impeach the credibility of a
testifying witness is governed by the rules for impeachment, not the rules for
propensity evidence. Thus, it is to the impeachment rules that we must now
turn.
Rule 607 simply states the general principle that "[a]ny party, including
the party that called the witness, may attack the witness's credibility."' 9 ' Rules
608 and 609 address the issue of when character evidence may be used to
attack or support a witness's credibility (as opposed to impeachment of
credibility for other reasons, such as inability to perceive or recollect the events
testified to, bias, and so on). 194
Rule 609 is inapplicable to the present facts because it deals with
impeachment by prior wrongdoing that resulted in a criminal conviction.'9 5
This form of impeachment is permitted under the theory that, when a witness
has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, false statements, or other
serious crimes, then the jury may consider that fact as an indication that the
witness may have little regard for the oath to tell the truth even when he is
under the penalty of pejury.19 6
Rule 608, by contrast, deals with other instances in which evidence of a
person's "character" for truthfulness or untruthfulness may be admitted. That
Rule provides:

191

FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (emphasis added).

192

Id. at 404(a)(3).

1'
194

Id. at 607.

195

See id. at 609.
id.

196

See id. at 608-609.
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(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness's credibility
may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness's
reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about
that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the witness's character for truthfulness has been
attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal
conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible
to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to
attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. But
the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired
into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of: (1) the witness; or (2) another witness whose
character the witness being cross-examined has testified
about.' 97
The first thing we see from Rule 608 is that only certain forms of
character evidence are admissible when used to impeach a witness's credibility.
Under subsection (a), character evidence offered in the form of testimony from
witnesses other than the witness whose credibility is in question is limited to
reputation or opinion evidence. 198 Those witnesses are prohibited from
testifying on direct examination to specific instances of conduct that bear on the
subject witness's credibility.199
If a party wants to raise specific instances of a conduct regarding a
witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, such instances can only
be inquired into, at the judge's discretion, on cross examination.2 00 The crossexaminer must also take the witness at her answer: if she denies the prior
conduct or knowledge thereof, the questioner may not "prove it up" with
"extrinsic evidence" (i.e., testimony from other witnesses or documentary
evidence). These Rules seek to strike a balance between admitting evidence
relevant to witness credibility, while at the same time preventing secondary

197

Id. at 608.

198

Id. at 608(a).

199 Thus, for example, a witness can testify, "I've known John for ten years, and in my

opinion, he is an honest person"; but a witness cannot testify, "I know John is honest because six
years ago, he found a wallet with ten thousand dollars in it and turned it into the police, even
though he was desperate for money at the time."
200
This would occur either during cross-examination of the witness herself, or of another
witness who offered good reputation or opinion testimony on direct examination, for the purpose
of testing or undermining that reputation or opinion testimony. FED. R. EvID. 608(b). For
example, the cross-examiner might ask the witness from the example in the prior footnote: "You
think John is such an honest guy? Were you aware that he stole the life savings of a little old lady
through an Internet scam?"
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questions of credibility 201 from overwhelming the trial and distracting the fact
finder from the primary task of deciding the disputed issues in the case.
The second thing we see is that the only character trait that may be
utilized for the purposes of attacking or supporting witness credibility is the
trait of truthfulness or untruthfulness.2 02 Other character traits-such as
violence or peacefulness, negligence or carefulness, drunkenness or
temperance-are not admissible under this Rule to suggest that the witness is or
is not being dishonest on the stand.203
With this background, the student-lawyer, in the role of the defense,
can now apply these Rules to the line of questioning at hand. As to the
"admissibility" of Proctor's claim that Abigail was thrown out of church for
laughing during prayer, the first potential difficulty the defense lawyer must
reckon with is whether it was introduced in an admissible form. Although
Abigail is in the room, and although she is later questioned about related
matters, when Proctor first introduces the alleged wrongdoing, he effectively
does so through his own direct "testimony," not through "cross-examination"
of Abigail. Under Rule 608(b), his testimony would be "extrinsic evidence" of
Abigail's misconduct, and so it would be inadmissible.204
The second difficulty the defense lawyer faces is whether the
accusation regarding Abigail's prior conduct goes to "truthfulness or
untruthfulness," as is required by the Rule. 2 0 5 Laughing during prayer is a
specific instance of conduct that arguably bears on the character trait of
religiosity or secularism, not truthfulness or untruthfulness. Alternatively, being
expelled from church for disruption, for whatever reason, may bear on the traits
(particularly in a minor) of lack of discipline, disobedience, or frivolity, but it is
not necessarily indicative of whether the witness is likely to be a truth teller.
Thus, it appears that it would be difficult to convince a judge to admit
Abigail's prior misconduct in church to impeach Abigail's testimony by
character for untruthfulness.

For example, "Did John really return the wallet? Did he really defraud the little old lady?"
See FED. R. EviD. 608(b).
203
Such evidence might be relevant to a witness's credibility under other theories--e.g.,
someone's chronic alcoholism may have impaired their ability to perceive or recollect the events
testified to-but they are not admissible as characterevidence used to impeach credibility.
204
For that matter, Parris's attempt to "rehabilitate" Abigail's credibility-by asserting that
when she engaged in the misconduct, she was "under Tituba's power at that time"-appears to be
extrinsic evidence that is likewise inadmissible. MILLER, supra note 19, at 104. Parris's
statement, however, may be characterized as argument, not an attempt to present factual evidence
to the court.
205
See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
201

202
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Limitations on Using Character to Attack Credibility

The defense lawyer, not wanting to give up on admitting this damaging
fact against Abigail, would argue that disregarding the solemnity of church
services is indicative of a disregard for the solemnity of court, and so bears on
the credibility of Abigail's testimony. She could argue that Abigail's disrespect
for prayer shows that she is not a "good Christian," and therefore is more likely
both to perjure herself and to attempt to secure a baseless conviction for a
capital crime against Elizabeth. If it is a sin to lie and falsely accuse, and
devotion to God protects one from such sin, then one's religiosity is directly
probative of one's truthfulness. Thus, laughing during prayer is a specific
instance of conduct that is relevant to a witness's character for "truthfulness or
untruthfulness" under Rule 608(b).
The argument is discomfiting because it flies directly in the face of our
modem American sensibilities regarding the separation of church and state.
Doctrinally speaking, it also flies in the face of the controlling rule of evidence,
Rule 610: "Evidence of a witness's religious beliefs or opinions is not
admissible to attack or support the witness's credibility." 206 Under Rule 610,
the fact that one is a "good" Christian (or a Christian at all) is deemed
irrelevant as a matter of law to the question of whether one is an honest
witness, and so Abigail's conduct in church should be inadmissible as evidence
bearing on her credibility.
Obviously, The Crucible is set well before the adoption of the Bill of
Rights and its protections regarding freedom of religion. In the socio-legal
context of the events in the play, one's religiosity and honesty/goodness are
inextricably bound up. Indeed, the entire notion of having witchcraft as a
"crime" punishable by the courts could only exist in a society that did not
recognize a separation of church and state. Although the student-lawyer must,
of course, know when a rule of law is directly on point, the analysis is more
nuanced and, frankly, more interesting if one visualizes the evidentiary
landscape as if Rule 610 had not yet been enacted and as if Abigail's church
misconduct is at least potentially admissible.207
The student-lawyer thus finds herself in an interesting ethical dilemma.
Substantively, she seeks to prevent religious hysteria from holding sway and
generating an empirically dubious legal outcome in the witchcraft trials, and so
may be reluctant to emphasize the relevance of one's religious devotion to the
legal proceedings. At the same time, if she is operating under an evidentiary

206

Id. at 610.

This is not that different from what occurs in a modem Evidence class. For example, I have
asked my students to consider what the outcome of a disputed evidentiary issue in a sexual
assault or molestation case would be under the default character evidence principles in Rules 404
and 405, without regard to the effect that Rules 412-415, which permit admission of the
defendant's prior acts in sex offense cases, would have.
207
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rubric in which the religion-credibility connection is fair game, she arguably
should try to use it to her advantage to impair the credibility of Elizabeth's
chief accuser, Abigail. Thus, in one brief passage, The Crucible illustrates the
interplay between substance, procedure, strategy, and ethics-the four
dimensions that are present in every decision a trial lawyer makes.
3.

The Proctors' Credibility
a.

Impeachment by Character Versus Impeachment for
Bias

The connection between religious devotion and credibility that is
prohibited by Rule 610, yet is essentially taken for granted throughout the play,
does not only impact Abigail. In Act Two, Hale interrogates the Proctors, in an
apparent attempt to satisfy himself, prior to formal judicial intervention,
regarding the rumors and allegations about them. Hale asks Proctor point blank:
"I thought, sir, to put some questions as to the Christian character of this house,
if you'll permit me."208 Among other things, Hale seeks to determine whether
the Proctors believe in witches, or whether they "fly against the Gospel":
HALE: Proctor, let you open with me now, for I have heard a
thing that troubles me. It's said you hold no belief that there
may even be witches in the world. Is that true, sir?
PROCTOR, he knows this is critical, and is striving against his
disgust with Hale and with himselffor even answering: I know
not what I have said, I may have said it. I have wondered if
there be witches in the world-although I cannot believe they
come among us now.
HALE: Then you do not believePROCTOR: I have no knowledge of it; the Bible speaks of
witches, and I will not deny them.

HALE: And you, woman?
ELIZABETH: I-I cannot believe it.
HALE, shocked: You cannot!
ELIZABETH: I cannot think the Devil may own a woman's soul,
Mister Hale, when she keeps an upright way, as I have. I am a
good woman, I know it; and if you believe I may do only good

208

MILLER, supra note

19, at 64.
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work in the world, and yet be secretly bound to Satan, then I
must tell you, sir, I do not believe it.
HALE: But, woman, you do believe there are witches inELIZABETH: If you think I am one, then I say there are none.
HALE: You surely do not fly against the Gospel, the GospelPROCTOR: She believe in the Gospel, every word! 209
This line of questioning, if asked in court, would clearly run afoul of
Rule 610. But this does not mean that any mention of religion would be
forbidden even under the current Rule. As the advisory committee's note to
Rule 610 state:
[w]hile the rule forecloses inquiry into the religious beliefs or
opinions of a witness for the purpose of showing that his
character for truthfulness is affected by their nature, an inquiry
for the purpose of showing interest or bias because of them is
not within the prohibition. Thus disclosure of affiliation with a
church which is a party to the litigation would be allowable
under the rule.2 10
In an interesting inversion, Proctor himself relies on the distinction
between using religion for credibility and using it for other purposes. As he is
being cross-examined by Hale on the basis of his spotty church attendance
record and seemingly inadequate devotion to Christian practices, he tries to
recast the issue as one of personal animus against the reverend Parris:
HALE: In the book of record that Mister Parris keeps, I note
that you are rarely in the church on Sabbath Day....
PROCTOR: I surely did come when I could, and when I could
not I prayed in this house.
HALE: Mister Proctor, your house is not a church; your
theology must tell you that.
PROCTOR: It does, sir, it does; and it tells me that a minister
may pray to God without he have golden candlesticks upon the
altar.
HALE: What golden candlesticks?

209
210

Id. at 69-70.
FED. R. EvID. 610 advisory committee's note.
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Since we built the church there were pewter
candlesticks upon the altar; Francis Nurse made them, y'know,
and a sweeter hand never touched the metal. But Parris came,
and for twenty weeks he preached nothin' but golden
candlesticks until he had them. I labor the earth from dawn of
day to blink of night, and I tell you true, when I look to heaven
and see my money glaring at his elbows-it hurt my prayer,
sir, it hurt my prayer. I think, sometimes, the man dreams
cathedrals, not clapboard meetin' houses.
PROCTOR:

HALE, thinks, then: And yet, Mister, a Christian on Sabbath
Day must be in church. Pause. Tell me-you have three
children.
PROCTOR:

Aye. Boys.

HALE: How come it that only two are baptized?
PROCTOR, starts to speak, then stops, then, as though unable to

restrainthis: I like it not that Mister Parris should lay his hand
upon my baby. I see no light of God in that man. I'll not
conceal it. 211
Although Proctor would rather not have his religiosity injected into the
proceedings, if it is going to be so injected, he (or his lawyer) would actually
emphasize his dislike of Parris, which would be less damaging in the eyes of
the law than a perceived dislike of the Lord. This illustrates another important
lesson for the student-lawyer: the evidentiary positions that the parties stake out
in litigation are not intrinsic, but rather are contingent on the context and the
strategic advantages conferred thereby.
b.

Character at Issue

As noted above, the character evidence rules limit both the
circumstances and the forms in which character evidence is admissible. These
limitations often interact. For example, under Rule 405(a), in the relatively
narrow exception to the general ban on propensity evidence, such evidence is
usually limited to the form of reputation or opinion, not specific instances of
conduct. 212 However, under Rule 405(b), when character or a character trait is
itself at issue in the case, evidence of specific instances bearing on the relevant
trait is also admissible.2 13

211 MILLER, supra note 19, at 64-65.
212 See FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
213
For example, in a civil action for negligence, the issue is whether the defendant drove
negligently on the event in question, not whether he is a bad driver generally, so character is not
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Under the Salemite legal system, the issue of the "Christian character"
of Proctor's house is arguably not only one of credibility, but also goes to the
issue of susceptibility to the forces of the Devil himself-the root source of
witchcraft-and so really does become an issue of propensity. As Hale states,
"the Devil is a wily one," 214 and utmost fidelity to the Bible and Christian
principles is apparently essential to shielding oneself from the Devil's
influence: "Theology, sir, is a fortress; no crack in a fortress may be accounted
small." 21 5 Thus, the less loyal one is to the Bible generally, the more likely it is
that one may have been practicing witchcraft on a particular occasion.
This view-that religiosity affects not only credibility but also the
merits of the substantive allegations of witchcraft-can impact the forms of
character evidence that may be admitted. In his interrogation of Proctor, Hale
inquires into Proctor's church attendance record, his decision not to have his
youngest child baptized, and his ability to recite the Ten Commandments.2 16
These are specific instances bearing on Proctor's "Christian character." If
character is not at issue in a witchcraft trial, such questions would not be
permitted if offered in court for the propensity inference.2 17 But if one's
"Christian-ness" is inextricably bound up with the likelihood that one could fall
under the power of the Devil and thus engage in witchcraft, character could be
deemed to be at issue.
The defense lawyer, looking to make whatever distinction would
benefit her client, would want to argue that even if one's religiosity were
relevant to a charge of witchcraft,21 8 it is not at issue, in the sense that it is not
an essential element of a claim or defense that a party must prove to prevail. To

at issue. By contrast, in an action against the car owner for negligently entrusting his car to the
driver, the driver's general trait or reputation for careless driving is relevant-not to proving that
the driver negligently caused the accident, but to the owner's own negligence in deciding to lend
the car to the driver notwithstanding that he knew or should have known that the driver was unfit.
Thus, the driver's history of causing accidents-specific instances bearing on his carelessnesswould be inadmissible in the negligence action, but would be admissible in the negligent
entrustment action.
214

MILLER, supra note 19, at 64.

215

Id. at 69.

Id. at 66-67; see also id. at 58 (Mary Warren recounts an incident at Sarah Good's trial
where her inability to recall her commandments is deemed to be "hard proof, hard as rock" of her
guilt.).
217
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
218
Obviously, today, such evidence would be excluded on relevance grounds alone. We take
for granted that there is no such thing as witchcraft-or at least, that if it exists, it is not a
phenomenon capable of being proven in court. As such, we would also reject the notion that
someone's susceptibility to it could be inferred by their record of church attendance or other
anecdotal evidence of religiosity. But again, the seventeenth-century Salemite legal system took
the existence of witchcraft for granted just as much as we do its non-existence. Given that
premise, its courts' willingness to consider character evidence as probative in witchcraft cases
cannot be so easily dismissed.
216
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analogize: in a fraud case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant lied on the
event in question, not that he lied previously or tends to lie generally. Thus, a
prior lie is a specific instance of dishonesty that would not be admissible under
the theory that character is at issue. So, too, Proctor's weak observance of
religious practices need not be established in order to prove that witchcraft
occurred. It is a fine distinction that the judge may not accept, but the studentlawyer has to be prepared to articulate it forcefully to maximize her chances of
success.
c.

Particular Exceptions to the Ban on Character
Evidence

One need not necessarily explain away the difference between the
evidentiary treatment of witchcraft under the Salemite legal system and our
own by pointing to social differences that have developed in the last two
hundred years. Rather, it may be that even back then, the system treated
witchcraft differently than it did other types of cases. The nature of such
distinctions may have changed, but they have not disappeared. Indeed, the
Rules themselves contain certain anomalous exceptions to the general ban on
character evidence that treat certain types of cases differently from all others.
Consider, for example, that under the Rules, although character
evidence is generally inadmissible when offered against a criminal defendant in
the first instance, 219 and is generally inadmissible in civil cases, a very different
regime exists in cases involving allegations of sexual assault or child
molestation. Pursuant to Rules 413 through 415, so long as the prosecution or
plaintiff, as applicable, provides adequate advance notice of intent to introduce
evidence of the defendant's prior specific acts of sexual assault or
molestation,220 such evidence can "be considered for any matter to which it is
relevant,",22 1 including the propensity inference.
Why is propensity evidence permitted in these types of cases but not
others? Because sex offense and molestation cases are determined to be
"different."222 In the words of the principal Congressional sponsor of the
special rules:
219
Under the "mercy rule" and related doctrines, a criminal defendant may offer evidence of
his good character or evidence of the witnesses' bad character, and the prosecution may only
offer evidence of the defendant's bad character if the defendant "opens the door" by availing
himself of these options. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A)-(B).
220

See id at 413(b), 414(b), 415(b).

Id. at 413(a), 414(a), 415(a).
222
Rules 413 through 415 were not a product of the usual procedure by which Federal Rules
of Evidence are promulgated. They were added to the rules by Congress in the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; see also
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 134 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2011-12 ed.) [hereinafter
Bender].
221
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The proposed reform is . . . justified by the distinctive

characteristics of the cases it will affect. In child molestation
cases, for example, a history of similar acts tends to be
exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual
disposition of the defendant-a sexual or sadosexual interest in
children that simply does not exist in ordinary people. . . .
[Child molestation] cases require reliance on child victims
whose credibility can readily be attacked in the absence of
substantial corroboration.223
This statement sounds strikingly similar to Judge Danforth's assertion that
witchcraft trials should not be governed by the ordinary procedures of adducing
proof because witchcraft is not "an ordinary crime," and so we "must rely upon
[the witch's] victims." 2 24 It also echoes Danforth's conflation of intrinsic moral
failure with clear legal guilt:
DANFORTH: [A] person is either with this court or he must be

counted against it, there be no road between. This is a sharp
time, now, a precise time-we no longer live in the dusky
afternoon when evil mixed itself with good and befuddled the
world. Now, by God's grace, the shining sun is up, and them
that fear not light will surely praise it. I hope you will be one of
those.225
Both then and now, evidence law is, for better or worse, hardly immune from
social and cultural tides. Rather, evidence law is a reflection of the types of
"facts" that ought to be legitimately considered by a rational finder of fact, and
so necessarily reflects, explicitly or implicitly, assumptions about what facts are
"given" and what inferences are "fair" or "logical." The astute student-lawyer
cannot be blind to this critical dynamic. Analyzing this phenomenon in a
different culture, as in that portrayed in The Crucible, can help the studentlawyer better recognize it in her own. Honing this skill is not merely a matter of
understanding policy for its own sake; it will facilitate the identification and
articulation of arguments that will be persuasive to a judge or other decision
maker.
d.

Inconsistent Applications of Bias

One cannot address witness credibility issues in The Crucible without
taking note of which biases the court will recognize as relevant to credibility,
145 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Susan Molinari) (floor
statement concerning the Prior Crimes Evidence Rules for Sexual Assault and Child Molestation
Cases).
223

224
225

MILLER, supra note 19, at 100.
Id. at 94.
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and which ones it will not. For example, early in Act Three, when Proctor first
raises his intent to expose the falsity of the girls' accusation in order to clear
Elizabeth's name, Danforth admonishes Proctor that his interest in the matter
may cloud his objectivity:
DANFORTH: I understand well, a husband's tenderness may
drive him to extravagance in defense of a wife. Are you certain
2 26
in your conscience, Mister, that your evidence is the truth?
Toward the end of the same Act, when Elizabeth denies knowledge of
Proctor's affair with Abigail (which Proctor has just admitted), Danforthrather than consider the possibility that she is simply trying to save her husband
from public humiliation, as Hale does-views this as rock solid proof that
Proctor is lying about the affair, and thus that he is lying about Abigail having
fabricated the allegation of witchcraft:
DANFORTH, reaches out and holds herface, then: Look at me!
To your own knowledge, has John Proctor ever committed the
crime of lechery? In a crisis of indecisions, she cannot speak.

Answer my question! Is your husband a lecher!
ELIZABETH, faintly: No, sir.
DANFORTH: Remove her, Marshal.
PROCTOR: Elizabeth, tell the truth!
DANFORTH: She has spoken. Remove her!
PROCTOR, crying out: Elizabeth, I have confessed it!
ELIZABETH: Oh, God! The door closes behindher.
PROCTOR: She only thought to save my name!
HALE: Excellency, it is a natural lie to tell . . . From the

beginning this man has struck me true. By my oath to Heaven,
I believe him now, and I pray you call back his wife before
weDANFORTH: She spoke nothing of lechery, and this man lies! 227
Thus, when Proctor testifies favorably for his wife, its probity is
discounted by the judge as stemming from Proctor's affection for her. But
when Elizabeth does the same-testifying in a manner that she believes favors

226

Id. at 89.

227

Id. at 113-14.
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her husband-the judge disregards her bias entirely and accepts her testimony
as truth. A defense lawyer would likely want to rail against such hypocrisy.
But a sophisticated prosecutor could argue that Danforth's positions are
not necessarily as inconsistent as they may seem. When Danforth admonishes
Proctor about how his bias may affect his testimony, it is before Proctor has
testified, as part of an attempt to dissuade him from doing so. Elizabeth, by
contrast, does give affirmative testimony, and once she does she is charged
with telling the truth and may be held to her answers, notwithstanding any
potential biases.
In any event, assuming Danforth does exhibit hypocrisy in his rulings,
this only highlights a major limitation of the Rules of Evidence: they govern
whether the fact finder should receive certain evidence, and for what
purpose(s), but they cannot control what the fact finder does with the evidence
once received. The Rules of Evidence are designed to ensure that the
information considered by the jury meets minimum thresholds of reliability and
to ensure that certain prejudicial evidence is excluded. But if the fact finder
deals inconsistently with the evidence, a party's only recourse is post-trial
motions or appeal (assuming such an avenue exists), not exclusion of the
evidence.2 2 8 Here, Danforth considers Hale's argument that Elizabeth's bias
explains her false testimony, and chooses to reject it. The Rules of Evidence are
a hedge against injustice, not a guaranty.
D.

PersonalKnowledge and Opinion Testimony (Rules 602, 701-702)

One of the "most pervasive manifestation[s]" of the insistence upon
"the most reliable sources of information" is the requirement that a witness
(other than an expert witness) testify only to matters about which they possess
personal knowledge.2 29 If a witness testifies as to facts about which they lack
personal knowledge, there is no reason to believe that the facts testified to are
an accurate and reliable reflection of reality. Rule 602 provides, in pertinent
part: "A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness's own
testimony." 23 0 This Rule requires that "a witness who testified to a fact which
can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and
must have actually observed the fact." 23 1

228
229

See FED. R. EvID. 102, 611.
FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee's note (quoting McCORMICK ET AL.,
supra note 185,

§ 10, at 20).
230
Id. at 602.
231

Id. at 602 advisory committee's note (quoting MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 185, § 10, at

20).
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Moreover, under Rule 701, although lay witnesses may testify in the
form of an opinion, they may only do so if the opinion is "(a) rationally based
on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702."232 The
distinction between lay testimony and expert testimony is that lay testimony
"results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life," while expert
testimony "results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by
specialists in the field."2 3 3
1.

Mary Warren's Personal Knowledge and Lay Opinion

The Crucible obviously implicates issues
witness can have "personal knowledge" of, as well as
a "process of reasoning familiar in everyday life."
remarks to the Proctors about her "discovery" that
harm her through witchery:

regarding what facts a
what opinions result from
Consider Mary Warren's
Sarah Good had tried to

MARY WARREN: [Sarah Good] tried to kill me many times,
Goody Proctor!
ELIZABETH:

Why, I never heard you mention that before.

MARY WARREN: I never knew it before. I never knew anything
before. When she come into the court I say to myself, I must
not accuse this woman, for she sleep in ditches, and so very old
and poor. But then-then she sit there, denying and denying,
and I feel a misty coldness climbin' up my back, and the skin
on my skull begin to creep, and I feel a clamp around my neck
and I cannot breathe air; and then-entranced-Ihear a voice,
a screamin' voice, and it were my voice-and all at once I
remembered everything she done to me!
PROCTOR: Why? What did she do to you?

like one awakened to a marvelous secret
insight: So many time, Mr. Proctor, she come to this very door
beggin' bread and a cup of cider-and mark this: whenever I
MARY WARREN,

turned her away empty, she mumbled.

...

WARREN: But what does she mumble? You must
remember, Goody Proctor-last month-a Monday, I thinkMARY

232

Id. at 701.

Id. at 701 advisory committee's note (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn.
1992)).
233
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she walked away and I thought my guts would burst for two
days after. Do you remember it?2 34
Mary Warren may have personal knowledge through her senses of the
"misty coldness climbin' up [her] back," the "skin on [her] skull begin to
creep," or the "clamp around [her] neck" while in court. She also would have
personal knowledge of hearing Sarah Good "mumble" things. And she would
be in a position to say whether she suffered a sensation of asphyxiation, or
severe intestinal discomfort, shortly after hearing that mumbling. But she is not
qualified to testify to a causal connection between any of her symptoms and
any wrongdoing by Sarah Good, whom she never personally observed lay a
finger on her. Indeed, in Act One, Hale seems to indicate that an understanding
of the workings of witches and related supernatural beings is something
reserved for the realm of experts, not lay people.235
Moreover, Mary Warren's concession in response to Elizabeth's
remark that she had never previously mentioned Good's attempts to kill her,
that she "never knew it before," simply confirms that her conclusion is just
that-a conclusion, not "rationally based on the witness's perception.",23 6
Indeed, it was only her odd sensations in court while Good was testifying that
led her to conclude for the first time that the prior instances of mumbling were
attempts on her life.237
But in the play, this type of evidence is not simply dismissed as the
speculations of an imaginative and impressionable young girl. In Act Three,
Danforth himself endorses such evidence, given the "unique" nature of
witchcraft:
DANFORTH: In an ordinary crime, how does one defend the
accused? One calls up witnesses to prove his innocence. But
witchcraft is ipso facto, on its face and by its nature, an
invisible crime, is it not? Therefore, who may possibly be
witness to it? The witch and the victim. None other. Now we
cannot hope the witch will accuse herself; granted? Therefore,
we must rely upon her victims ... 238
Danforth's logic is, on its own terms, ineluctable: the only possible
proof of witchcraft is victim testimony. Hale quickly raises an obvious problem
with this approach-if victim testimony is the sole basis for conviction, then
victim credibility becomes pivotal: "But this child claims the girls are not

234

MILLER, supra note

235

Id at 39.

236

FED. R. EVID.

19, at 57-58.

701.

E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 795 (West 2012) (imposing significant restrictions on "suppressed
memory" evidence recollected under hypnosis).
238
MILLER, supra note 19, at 100.
237
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truthful, and if they are not . . . .,,239 Danforth responds that he is testing the
girls' credibility; although as discussed above, his "tests" are hardly what we
would consider fair or sensible.
But the problem runs much deeper than one of mere credibility. It is
not simply that an alleged victim may be lying: one confronts this issue, for
example, with alleged claims of "date rape," where the only witnesses with
knowledge are the accused, who denies guilt, and the victim; although at least
there, physical evidence may corroborate the victim's claim.2 4 0 Rather, the
"victim" here cannot possibly have personal knowledge that any given
symptom or happening is the direct result of witchcraft. It would be akin to a
woman claiming she was raped while she was unconscious, by someone whom
she never saw drug her. It is not merely that we think the witness may be
disingenuous; it is that we know she could not know what she claims to know.
If witchcraft is ipso facto an "invisible crime," and thereby imperceptible to the
senses, then it is not, as Danforth claims, a crime susceptible to proof by any
witness testimony.
2.

Hale's Expert Qualifications

To qualify the immediately preceding statement: the invisible crime of
witchcraft is not susceptible to proof by witness testimony, unless one
considers witchcraft to be a proper subject of expert testimony. Hale purports to
be well-versed in recognizing the signs of witchcraft, and in the taxonomy of
evil spirits:
HALE: Now let me instruct you. We cannot look to
superstition in this. The Devil is precise; the marks of his
presence are definite as stone [referring to one of his texts] ...
. Here is all the invisible world, caught, defined, and
calculated. In these books the Devil stands stripped of all his
brute disguises. Here are all your familiar spirits-your incubi

239

id.
Notably, another primary rationale for the creation of Rules 413 through 415, which allow
evidence of the defendant's prior acts or crimes in sexual assault or child molestation cases, was
that the cases would often turn on difficult credibility determinations of victims:
[Child molestation] cases require reliance on child victims whose credibility
can readily be attacked in the absence of substantial corroboration. ...
Similarly, adult-victim sexual assault cases are distinctive, and often turn on
difficult credibility determinations. Alleged consent by the victim is rarely an
issue in prosecutions for other violent crimes ....
140 CONG. REc. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Susan Molinari) (floor
statement concerning the Prior Crimes Evidence Rules for Sexual Assault and Child Molestation
Cases).
240
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and succubi; your witches that go by land, by air, by sea; your
wizards of the night and of the day.2 1
The question is whether Hale would be permitted to provide expert
opinion testimony on the subject of witchcraft. Rule 702 provides that
[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliabl applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
Here, if anyone in Salem is qualified to detect a witch, it is Hale. Not
only is he a reverend, a man of God, but unlike Parris, he is learned in the art of
reading the signs and methods of sorcerers and the like. There is no serious
doubt that he is applying his methods and principles reliably to the facts before
him. The only question is whether his principles and methods are themselves
reliable.
Given the state of knowledge and the prevailing beliefs at the time,
Hale's methods of ferreting out witches would indeed have been deemed
reliable, as opposed to "superstition." The notion that judges should serve as
gatekeepers 24 to keep "junk" science out of the courtroom necessarily make
the admissibility determination dependent on the judge's conception of what is
junk and what is not.244 In Salem in 1692, what we might call junk science
today was the prevailing paradigm. That the "state of the art" was so

241
242

MILLER, supra note 19, at 38-39.
FED. R. EVID. 702.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) ("[U]nder the Rules
the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable."); id at 597 (referring to the "gatekeeping role for the judge").
244
Daubert held that the Rules superseded the "general acceptance" test of Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and its progeny, utilized by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Daubert standard ostensibly places a greater burden on federal judges to
independently evaluate the scientific merits of the expert opinion. As Professor Mendez has
written:
While Daubert forces federal judges to determine the scientific validity of all
expert testimony grounded in science, [Frye] merely requires California
judges to determine whether the contested principle or technique has been
243

accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community . . . . The head

counting obligation [Frye] imposes on California judges is obviously much
less onerous than the burden Daubertplaces on federal judges.
Mendez, supra note 166, § 16.07, at 646.
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rudimentary was a failing of science, not of a legal system that accepted the
science as reliable.245 Hale would have been deemed well-qualified to give
expert opinion testimony.
Ironically, Hale's "expert" assessment of the evidence-that Proctor is
telling the truth and Abigail is lying-is ultimately based on nothing more than
his assessment of the witnesses' respective credibility.2 46 And despite Hale's
qualifications and relative sophistication, his opinion is roundly rejected by
Danforth, who relies on Abigail's word until the end.247
3.

Doctor Griggs's Examination of Sarah Good and "Junk
Science"

It should be noted that whether judicial reception of junk science will
result in an unfair or undesirable result is indeterminate a priori.For example,
Mary Warren, in reporting further on the trial of Sarah Good, remarks that
Good was discovered to be pregnant:
ELIZABETH: Pregnant! Are they mad?-the woman's near to
sixty!
MARY WARREN: They had Doctor Griggs examine her, and
she's full to the brim. And smokin' a pipe all these years, and
no husband either! But she's safe, thank God, for they'll not
hurt the innocent child. 24 8
Doctor Griggs never appears onstage, and we know nothing about his
qualifications; we only briefly hear second-hand from Mary Warren that he
examined Sarah Good and concluded she was with child. We do not know how
or under what circumstances he "examined" Good, and we do not know the
basis for his conclusion that she is pregnant, other than that she was "full to the
brim."2 4 9 If "full to the brim" means she has a distended belly, it is probably a

Indeed, the now-discredited discipline of phrenology was accorded judicial legitimacy less
than 200 years ago. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1966) ("In the preM'Naghten period, the concepts of phrenology and monomania were being developed and had
significant influence on the right and wrong test.. . . Of course, both phrenology and monomania
are rejected today as meaningless medical concepts since the human personality is viewed as a
fully integrated system. But, by an accident of history, the rule of M'Naghten's case froze these
concepts into the common law just at a time when they were becoming obsolete."). The famous
M'Naghten case took place in 1843.
246
MILLER, supra note 19, at 114 ("HALE: From the beginning this man has struck me true. By
my oath to Heaven, I believe him now .... Pointing at Abigail: This girl has always struck me
false!").
247
Id. at 120.
248
Id. at 59.
245

249

id
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symptom of malnourishment or general ill health, not pregnancy. And
Elizabeth's reaction-"Are they mad?-the woman's near to sixty"-indicates
that his opinion would have been deemed facially implausible even to a lay
person.
It may well be that Griggs, like Hale, was relying on the "state of the
art" at the time, and thus his conclusions-no matter how implausible-would
be deemed to be based on "sufficient facts or data," and was the "product of
reliable principles and methods" that were "reliably applied" to those facts.250
But unless and until that foundation is established, Griggs should not be
permitted to offer his opinions.
What is notable about the court's apparent willingness to accept
Griggs's conclusion is not the reliability of the conclusion itself, but the
practical impact of accepting it. The prevailing norm was that the execution of
pregnant witches would be delayed until birth, so that they would "not hurt the
innocent child." The doctor's finding of post-menopausal conception is likely
lunacy. But if that finding forestalls the lunacy of being executed for the
"invisible crime" of witchcraft, then the court's receptivity to it may be an
abomination of justice that the defense lawyer would be happy to live with.
Once again, from the trial lawyer's perspective, strategy trumps substance in
matters of evidence.
E.

Hearsay and Its Exceptions (Rules 801-807)

The hearsay rule and its exceptions are an attempt to reconcile two
fundamental competing concerns in the law of evidence. On the one hand, in
order to evaluate a witness's perception, memory, ability to narrate, and
sincerity, all testimony would ideally be given (1) under oath, (2) in the
presence of the trier of fact, and (3) subject to cross-examination. 25 1
Conversely, to admit only evidence that satisfies all three conditions-which
would mean excluding all out-of-court statements-would exclude much
relevant evidence and would undermine the truth-seeking goal. "The solution
evolved by the common law has been a general rule excluding hearsay but
subject to numerous exceptions under circumstances supposed to furnish
guarantees of trustworthiness." 25 2 The student-lawyer must have a good handle
on the law of hearsay.253

250

FED. R. EviD. 702.
Bender, supra note 222, at 206.
252
Id. at 207.
253
The definition of hearsay under the current Rules is "a [prior] statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted [by the declarant]." FED. R. EvtD. 80 1(c).
251
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The Neighbors' Good Character Statements

There are numerous instances in The Crucible where second-hand
information is offered as evidence, raising hearsay concerns, and implicating
one or more exceptions to the hearsay rule. When Proctor approaches Danforth
early in Act Three to persuade him to free Proctor's wife and their friends,
Proctor produces several documents. Among them is a written statement of
ninety-one villagers: "It's sort of a testament. The people signing it declare
their good opinion of Rebecca [Nurse], and my wife, and Martha Corey." 254
Danforth does not reject the "testament" on the grounds that it is
improper opinion or character testimony. A modern judge would not either
because such opinion testimony squarely falls within the "mercy rule" that
permit a criminal accused to offer good character testimony, limited to the form
of reputation or opinion, to suggest that the defendant is not the 'type" of
person that would commit the crime.2 55 However, Danforth does adopt Parris's
suggestion to have the declarants "summoned. . . . [flor questioning[,]" and

issues warrants for their "arrest for examination." 2 56 While Danforth does not
endorse Parris's view that their statements are "necessarily an attack" on the
court, he does assert that if they are "all covenanted Christians"-and thus
presumably honest-then "they have nothing to fear" from examination by the
court. 257
Would a hearsay exception apply to allow submission of this written
"testimony"? The student-lawyer would hope to find one. Rule 803(21)
provides a hearsay exception for "[a] reputation among a person's associates or
in the community concerning a person's character." 2 58 But the out-of-court
declarants here are offering testimony as to their respective opinions about the
defendant's character, not reputation testimony. Furthermore, the advisory
committee's note to Rule 803(21) makes clear that this hearsay exception was
designed not to absolve character witnesses of the need to appear in court, but
rather to ensure that the hearsay inherent in reputation testimony-the
witness's retelling of the collective character assessments of other members of
the community regarding an individual-is not excluded by the hearsay rule,
when such testimony is otherwise allowed as character evidence under Rule

MILLER, supra note 19, at 93.
See FED. R. Evio. 404(a)(2)(A) ("[1]n a criminal case ... a defendant may offer evidence of
the defendant's pertinent trait."); see also id. at 405(a) ("When evidence of a person's character
or character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person's reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.").
256
MILLER, supra note 19, at 93-94; see id. at 88 ("I accept no depositions.").
257
Id. at 94.
258
FED. R. EvID. 803(2 1).
254
255
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405(a).259 Thus, Danforth's demand for live testimony is, unfortunately for the
defense, in line with the modem Rules.
2.

Giles Corey's Deposition and Multiple Hearsay

Giles Corey then spurs Proctor to provide Danforth with Corey's own
written "deposition." Corey asserts therein that Thomas Putnam has induced his
daughter, Ruth, to falsely accuse Putnam's neighbor, George Jacobs, of
witchcraft, so that Jacobs would forfeit his land and Putnam might obtain
ownership of it. (Presumably, if Corey can discredit the Putnams, then he can
help discredit others accusers, including Susanna Walcott, who have testified
against Corey's wife, Martha.) But Danforth is not satisfied with the written
statement, and insists that the source of Corey's information be brought
personally before the court:
DANFORTH: But proof, sir, proof.
GILES, pointing at his deposition: The proof is there! I have it

from an honest man who heard Putnam say it! The day his
daughter cried out on Jacobs, he said she'd given him a fair gift
of land.
HATHORNE: And the name of this man? ...
GILES: I will not give you no name. I mentioned my wife's

name once and I'll bum in hell long enough for that. I stand
mute....
DANFORTH: Old man, if your informant tells the truth let him

come here openly like a decent man. But if he hides in
anonymity I must know why.260
From a hearsay perspective, Corey's written swom statement is more
problematic than the first one Proctor had offered, as it contains multiple levels
of hearsay. First, the document itself was created out-of-court, and therefore
must satisfy a hearsay exception if offered for the truth of the matter asserted
therein.261 Second, it contains substantive allegations against Putnam that Corey

See FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note to Exceptions (19), (20), and (21)
("Exception (21) recognizes the traditional acceptance of reputation evidence as a means of
proving human character. The exception deals only with the hearsay aspect of this kind of
evidence . ... The exception is in effect a reiteration, in the context of hearsay, of Rule 405(a).").
Rule 405(a) provides that "[w]hen evidence of a person's character or character trait is
admissible, it may be provided by testimony about the person's reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion."
259

260
261

MILLER, supra note 19, at 96-97.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
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heard from the unnamed "honest man." And third, it records the statement that
the honest man purportedly heard Putnam say, linking Ruth's accusation
against Jacobs to the acquisition of Jacobs's land.
Pursuant to Rule 805, the proponent of an out-of-court statement must
identify a hearsay exception-or non-hearsay purpose-for each level of
hearsay in order for the full statement to be admitted.262 Here, the first level of
hearsay presents little difficulty, because Corey himself is present and subject
to cross-examination and could testify to the same things he declares in his outof-court deposition. So, too, the third level-Putnam's statement to the effect
that, by accusing Jacobs of witchcraft, his daughter had "given him a fair gift of
land"-is not hearsay at all. It is not being offered for the truth of the matter
therein-that Ruth did in fact make a gift of land to her father by accusing
Jacobs-but rather is being offered circumstantially to show the bias, interest,
or state of mind of Putnam in having the charges leveled against Jacobs (and by
extension, goes to the credibility of his daughter, who appears to be the one
who provided the in-court testimony against Jacobs, and who may well have
done so at Putnam's request or insistence).2 63 However, Corey did not hear
Putnam's statement from Putnam directly; he heard it from his anonymous
source. Corey's recounting of what he heard the source tell him that Putnam
admitted to is relevant to Putnam's credibility only if it is true (i.e., the source
really did hear Putnam make the admission). There is no plausible hearsay
exception that would apply to the source's statement.264 Thus, a hearsay
objection would be sustained, and rightly so.
Danforth's position in both of these instances reflects a viewpoint that
is at the heart of the hearsay rule: a preference for testimony under oath in the
presence of the fact finder and subject to cross-examination. In the absence of a
hearsay exception, Danforth would be right to exclude the evidence. The
defense lawyer must find another way to make her case.
3.

Abigail's Revelation

Danforth is not the only one sensitive to the concerns about out-ofcourt statements. In Act One, before the hysteria regarding witchcraft has yet
fully bloomed, Abigail confides to Proctor that the girls' illness is not the result
of witchcraft:
Id. at 805 ("Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part
of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.").
263
In order to resolve any doubt about whether statements regarding a declarant's state of
mind are admissible for their truth or because they are circumstantial evidence of some other
relevant proposition, Rule 803(3) provides a hearsay exception for "[a] statement of the
declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan)." Id at 803(3).
264
Putnam's statement would not likely qualify as a "statement against interest" under Rule
803(b)(3), nor would it fit within the "residual exception" of Rule 807. For a more detailed
treatment of these exceptions, see discussion infra Part IV.E.3.
262
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PROCTOR: The road past my house is a pilgrimage to Salem all

morning. The town's mumbling witchcraft.
ABIGAIL: Oh, posh! Winningly she comes a little closer, with a
confidential, wicked air. We were dancin' in the woods last
night, and my uncle leaped in on us. She took fright, is all.265
Then, in Act Two, Proctor reveals Abigail's confession to Hale, but
acknowledges the difficulty he would face in having his account believed:
PROCTOR: I-I have no witness and cannot prove it, except my

word be taken. But I know the children's sickness had naught
to do with witchcraft.
HALE, stopped, struck: Naught to do-?
PROCTOR: Mr. Parris discovered them sportin' in the woods.
They were startled, and took sick.
Pause.
HALE: Who told you this?
PROCTOR, hesitates, then: Abigail Williams ....
HALE: [W]ould you testify to this in court? ...
PROCTOR: I may wonder if my story will be credited in such a
court.266
Proctor realizes that repeating an out-of-court statement will not be

given as much credence as having seen it personally, or as having the declarant
with personal knowledge admit to the underlying facts herself. (He is also, of
course, reluctant to reveal his own history with Abigail, and is skeptical given
the seemingly infallible trust that the court has placed in the girls.)
But despite the challenges, getting the court to consider this evidence
will be crucial to saving his wife and his friends. It is arguably the most
important fact in the case. Thus, this is yet another opportunity for the studentlawyer to strategize about the possible ways to admit this statement. There
could potentially be a number of hearsay exceptions-or non-hearsay
purposes-for offering the statement in court, all of which the student-lawyer

should consider as possibilities.

265

MILLER, supra note 19, at 21-22.

266

Id at 68.
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Non-Hearsay Impeachment

Assuming Abigail has already testified that the children's sickness was
the result of witchcraft, her statement to Proctor that the sickness was
fabricated would obviously contradict that statement. As such, the statement
would be relevant to impeach Abigail's credibility: she was willing to tell the
court one thing, yet told Proctor another. Technically, a statement offered
purely for impeachment purposes is not offered for the "truth of the matter
asserted," and so is not hearsay. According to this view, the statement could be
used not to prove that the sickness was in fact invented, but rather merely to
show that Abigail has talked out of both sides of her mouth, and thus her
testimony generally should be given less weight. Of course, if the initial
accusations were the result of a fabrication, this would cast serious doubt on the
accusations that followed.
Rule 613(b) requires that if extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement (i.e., anything other than the witness's own admission on the stand) is
offered to impeach the witness, the witness must be given an opportunity to
explain or deny it. 26 7 Here, Abigail is not confronted with Proctor's specific
statement, but she is given the opportunity to explain or deny the similar
allegation by Mary Warren that the girls have fabricated the accusations of
witchcraft. 26 8 The student-lawyer would argue that this is sufficient.
b.

Prior Inconsistent Statement

Ideally, the student-lawyer would want to offer Proctor's testimony
about Abigail's revelation not merely for impeachment of her trial testimony,
but also for the truth, i.e., as evidence that the girls' sickness was not the result
of witchcraft. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) excludes from the definition of hearsay a
statement of a witness that is "inconsistent with the declarant's testimony and
was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in
a deposition." 26 9 Although the Rules treat such a statement as being excluded
from the definition of hearsay,270 rather than as falling within an exception to
the hearsay rule,27 1 the practical effect is exactly the same: the proponent may
use the statement for the truth of the matter asserted. But here, Abigail's prior
statement to Proctor was made when they were alone together, not under
penalty of perjury, and so this exclusion/exception would not apply. As of yet,
267

See FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
See MLLER, supra note 19, at 102; FED. R. EVID. 613(b) ("Extrinsic evidence of a
witness's prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to
explain or deny the statement . . .
269
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
270
See id. at 801(d).
271
See id. at 803-804.
268
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the statement can still only be used for impeachment, not as substantive
evidence. Thus, the defense attorney would look for other exceptions or
exclusions that would make it admissible for the truth.
c.

Party-Opponent Admission

Although colloquially known as the hearsay exception for party
opponent "admissions," by the plain language of the Rule, any statement made
by an opposing party is admissible when offered against that party, whether
they are "admitting" to something or not.272 The difficulty with relying on this
rule, however, is that Abigail is not the "party opponent." Elizabeth is the
defendant, and Abigail is a witness against her. Indeed, even Abigail's status as
the alleged "victim" of Elizabeth's witchcraft does not make her the party
opponent for purposes of hearsay. In a criminal proceeding, the government,
not the victim, is the party.273
d.

Statement Against Interest

Assuming Abigail is not a party opponent, the defense attorney may try
to rely on the closely related hearsay exception for "statements against interest"
under Rule 804(b)(3). This exceptions applies to a statement that
a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have
made only if the person believed it to be true because, when
made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or

See id. at 801(d)(2)(A) (excluding from the definition of hearsay, "An Opposing Party's
Statement. [A] statement [that] is offered against an opposing party and was made by the party in
an individual or representative capacity"). As with prior statements of witnesses under Rule
801(d)(1), party-opponent admissions under Rule 801(d)(2) are treated as exclusions from the
definition of hearsay, rather than exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, as noted above, the
effect is still the same: they may be offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
273
See, e.g., United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 401, 410 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that
statements by employees or officers of an organization allegedly defrauded by the defendant
were not admissible as party-opponent admissions in prosecution of the defendant for fraud
because the organization was not a party thereto). If Abigail were the party-opponent, it would
raise interesting additional issues regarding admissions. For example, when Proctor publicly
accuses Abigail of having committed adultery with him, Danforth asks Abigail to respond:
DANFORTH, blanched, in horror, turning to Abigail: You deny every scrap
and title of this?
ABIGAIL: If I must answer that, sir, I will leave and I will not come back
again.
MILLER, supra note 19, at 111. Abigail does not actually deny the allegations, which at least
arguably indicate that they are true. This would seem to fit within the hearsay exclusion for
"adoptive admissions," perhaps as an admission by silence. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B)
(stating that party opponent admissions include a statement that "the party manifested that it
adopted or believed to be true").
272
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pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the
declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the
declarant to civil or criminal liability.274
The rationale for this exception is that people would not say things that
are against their financial or legal interests unless they are true.275 Here,
Abigail's revelation to Proctor arguably exposes her to liability for perjury now
that she has testified that the girls were victims of witchcraft.
However, there are several reasons why this exception would not
apply. First, such statements are only admissible if the declarant is
"unavailable" to testify pursuant to Rule 804(a).276 Abigail is not only available
to testify-she has testified.
Second, unlike a party-opponent "admission," the declarant of a
statement against interest really must have been "admitting" to something
27
harmful at the time the statement was made.27 Here, Abigail confided to
Proctor that the girls' illness was not the result of witchcraft before the formal
accusations and legal proceedings had begun. Thus, it cannot be established
that the statement was "so contrary to [her] proprietary or pecuniary interest,"
or would "expose [her] to civil or criminal liability," that she would not have
said it unless it was true.278 Granted, her statement could undermine the
credibility of the accusations she would later make against Elizabeth, and so
arguably could have a "tendency to invalidate [her] claim against someone
else." But here, too, the "claim" did not exist at the time, and there is no
evidence that she knew or had reason to know that she would become a star
witness in court proceedings. Indeed, it is plausible that at the time she made

274

FED.

R. EvID. 804(b)(3)(A).

275
See id. at 804 advisory committee's note to the Rule formerly numbered as 804(b)(4)
(renumbered as 807) [hereinafter FED. R. EVID. 807 A.C.N.] ("The circumstantial guaranty of
reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make statements
which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true."). Proctor
himself later invokes this rationale when he defends the credibility of his admission that he
committed adultery with Abigail: "A man will not cast away his good name. You surely know
that.. .. I have made a bell of my honor! I have rung the doom of my good name-you will
believe me, Mr. Danforth!" MILLER, supra note 19, at 110-11; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230
(West 2012) (hearsay exception for statements against interest includes those statements that
"created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the
community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true.").
276
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) ("The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness .... ); id. at 804(a) (defining "unavailability").
277
See FED. R. EvID. 807 A.C.N., supra note 275 ("If the statement is that of a party, offered
by his opponent, it comes in as an admission[], and there is no occasion to inquire whether it is
against his interest, this not being a condition precedent to admissibility of admissions by
opponents.").
278
FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3)(A).
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the statement, she was just trying to downplay the rumors in order to mollify or
entice Proctor.2 79
Third, in criminal cases, there is an additional foundational requirement
of corroboration of statements against interest. The Rule provides that a
statement against interest is admissible if it "is supported by corroborating
circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a
criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability." 28 0
A primary rationale for this requirement is the concern that a defendant will
fabricate a third-party "confession," or that a defense-friendly third party would
himself "confess" to the crime with which the defendant has been charged, in
order to generate reasonable doubt and secure an acquittal. 2 81 Here, Proctor is
not claiming that Abigail "confessed" to the crime with which Elizabeth has
been charged, so this rationale does not seem to apply. But it does fit within the
plain language of the Rule: his testimony, if believed, is tantamount to a
confession by Abigail that her accusation against Elizabeth was perjured, and
so arguably it "tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability." As such, in
order to admit her statement, the student-lawyer would have to point to
"corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness." The
only such "corroborating circumstance[s]" Proctor could offer are his
adulterous "knowledge" of Abigail, which, if believed, would go to undermine
her character, as well as to explain why she would be willing to reveal the
information to him in the first place. But of course, Proctor's attempt to
"corroborate" his account by revealing the affair takes a tragic turn when
Elizabeth unwittingly denies knowledge of it in an attempt to protect Proctor's
reputation.
Thus, the statement against interest exception likely cannot be relied
upon.
e.

Residual or "Catchall" Exception

In a last-ditch effort, the student-lawyer may seek to rely on the
"residual exception" under Rule 807, which may permit admission of a hearsay
statement that does not fit within any of the other exceptions under Rules 803
or 804. Such a statement may be admitted if:

279
Immediately after Abigail's revelation regarding having danced in the woods, Proctor's
"smile widen[s]," and he says, "[a]h, you're wicked yet, aren't y'!" The stage notes then provide
that "[a] trill of expectant laughter escapes her, and she dares come closer, feverishly looking into
his eyes." MILLER, supra note 19, at 22.
280

FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).

281

FED. R. EviD. 807 A.C.N., supra note 275 ("The requirement of corroboration ... [w]hen
the statement is offered by the accused by way of exculpation . . . should be construed in such a
manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.").
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(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through
reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.282
However, a parsing of that Rule should reveal why this tactic is not likely to
work.
As a preliminary matter, there is a threshold procedural foundation
requirement that sufficient advance notice of intent to invoke the Rule must be
given to the other side.283 Here, Proctor essentially "springs" his testimony on
Abigail.
Setting this aside, the bigger problem is that the substantive
foundational requirements probably cannot be met. Granted, Proctor's
testimony about Abigail's private revelation to him is "offered as evidence of a
material fact," as is required 28 4 -if the girls invented the initial episode of
"witchcraft," then every accusation that followed would be called into doubt.
And given Abigail's refusal to come clean, Proctor's testimony relating her
admission is "more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts."a28
However, the proponent must also establish that the statement has "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as statements admissible under
the other enumerated hearsay exceptions, such that "admitting it will best serve
the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice."2 86 But it is simply
Proctor's word against Abigail, and without the benefit of the knowledge that
the reader possesses, there is no reason why the court should credit his version
of events. Thus, for the same reason that the student-lawyer would likely be
unable to meet the "statement against interest" exception above-failure to
its
indicate
clearly
that
circumstances
"corroborating
establish
requirement
similar
the
meet
to
trustworthiness"-she would likely be unable
under the residual exception.
f.

Strategic Considerations Regarding Limited
Admissibility

Given that it is unlikely that there is a hearsay exception that would
apply, Proctor's testimony is admissible, if at all, only to impeach Abigail's

282

FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(l)-(4).

283

See id. at 807(b).

284

Id. at 807(a)(2).
Id. at 807(a)(3).
Id. at 807(a)(1), (4).

285
286
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credibility, not for the truth of the matter asserted. As such, we see once again
the critical importance of the judicial credibility contest to the fate of the Salem
villagers who stand accused in the play-much like in a modem-day trial.
The student-lawyer should also be aware that, if this were a jury trial,
then pursuant to Rule 105, the prosecutor would be entitled to a limiting
instruction admonishing the fact finder to consider Proctor's testimony only for
a limited purpose.2 87
At the same time, the student-lawyer can also appreciate the limited
strategic benefit of such an instruction. A jury is unlikely to truly understand,
let alone abide by, the fine distinction between considering the statement for its
truth and considering it for impeachment only. Indeed, the limiting instruction
may well backfire: like telling someone not to think about a pink elephant,
pointing out the impermissible inference may highlight the issue for the jury,
and make it more likely that they will indulge in that very inference.28 The
student-lawyer must always consider the overall strategic context of evidentiary
issues, and be cautious not to win an evidentiary battle only to lose the war.
V. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to present vignettes from The Crucible that illustrate

some of the more common and significant evidentiary issues that trial lawyers
tend to face in practice. One could identify a variety of other evidentiary issues
that have not been discussed herein-so many, in fact, that an exhaustive
analysis of them would be far longer than the play itself.
Does the play raise issues that implicate every single Federal Rule of
Evidence? Of course not. Neither does any trial, no matter how long or
complex it is. But the play does provide a valuable opportunity to explore the
policies and doctrinal nuances of the Rules as applied in a rich and holistic
factual context.
I recognize that a possible critique of this Article is that, in applying the
Federal Rules of Evidence to the disputed factual scenario in The Crucible, it
"takes law's boundaries for granted," and assumes the "law" to be "a domain
consisting almost entirely of rules." 28 9 As such, I arguably have sidestepped the
issue of what law "is", or what it does or should aspire to be.290

Rule 105 provides: "If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a
purpose-but not against another party or for another purpose-the court, on timely request,
must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." Id. at 105.
288
See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the
Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 301, 323 ("[L]imiting instructions are notoriously
ineffective. In fact, they may be counterproductive because they draw jurors' attention to the
evidence that is supposed to be ignored.").
289
Baron, supra note 9, at 1085.
290
See id.
287
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But I view this as a strength, not a weakness. Say what one will about
the Federal Rules of Evidence, they are, at the end of the day, rules. And they
operate in a context of adversarial litigation. In order for legal pedagogy to be
considered successful, it must do many things; but above all, it must empower
students to understand legal rules and apply them in the context in which they
will have to utilize them in practice. If a work of fiction can help students better
grasp the brass tacks of evidence law, and ultimately become more effective
lawyers, then it is a "reality" which we should take very seriously indeed. It
may not be "experiential learning" in the conventional sense, but it is an
experience worth having.
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